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PERFORMANCE	REPORTING	OF	COMPREHENSIVE	INCOME		
	
AND	EARNINGS	MANAGEMENT		
YITING	CAO		Boston	University	Questrom	School	of	Business,	2017	Major	Professor:	 Edward	Riedl,	Ph.D.,	Professor	and	Chair	of	Accounting,	Everett	W.	Lord	Distinguished	Faculty	Scholar		 ABSTRACT	In	 2011,	 the	 Financial	 Accounting	 Standards	 Board	 issued	 ASU	 2011-05,	which	mandates	that	Comprehensive	Income	(CI)	and	Other	Comprehensive	Income	(OCI)	 be	 reported	 in	 the	 performance	 statements	 (i.e.,	 either	 in	 the	 income	statement	 or	 a	 separate	 statement	 of	 comprehensive	 income)	 rather	 than	 in	 the	previously-allowed	equity	statement.	 	Using	this	 issuance	as	an	exogenous	event,	 I	examine	whether	the	presentation	of	accounting	information	in	different	statements	affects	 earnings	 management	 behavior.	 	 In	 particular,	 I	 investigate	 whether	 the	required	 presentation	 of	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	 performance	 statements	 reduces	 earnings	management	 through	 selective	 sales	 of	 available-for-sale	 (AFS)	 securities	 in	 the	banking	 industry.	 	 I	 first	 document	 that	 prior	 to	 ASU	 2011-05,	 banks	 presenting	CI/OCI	in	the	equity	statements	engage	in	more	management	of	realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities	compared	to	banks	presenting	CI/OCI	 in	 the	performance	statements.		More	importantly,	employing	a	difference-in-differences	design,	I	show	a	larger	reduction	in	(though	not	complete	elimination	of)	earnings	management	for	banks	 mandated	 to	 switch	 the	 reporting	 position	 of	 CI/OCI,	 relative	 to	 a	 control	group	 of	 banks	 voluntarily	 using	 performance	 statements	 prior	 to	 the	mandatory	
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adoption.	 	Overall,	this	evidence	suggests	that	mandated	reporting	of	CI/OCI	in	the	performance	statements	reduces	banks’	earnings	smoothing	behavior.	
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PERFORMANCE	REPORTING	OF	COMPREHENSIVE	INCOME	
AND	EARNINGS	MANAGEMENT	
1.		INTRODUCTION	This	 paper	 investigates	 whether	 presenting	 comprehensive	 income	 in	 the	performance	 statements	 rather	 than	 equity	 statements	 reduces	 earnings	management	 using	 realization	 of	 gains	 and	 losses	 on	 available-for-sale	 (AFS)	securities	in	the	banking	industry.		Accounting	Standard	Updates	(ASU)	No.	2011-05	(hereafter	 ASU	 2011-05)	 on	 Reporting	 of	 Comprehensive	 Income	 (Topic	 220)	requires	comprehensive	income	(CI)	and	other	comprehensive	income	(OCI)	items	to	be	reported	in	either	the	income	statement	or	a	separate	statement	immediately	following	 the	 income	 statement,	 both	 of	which	 are	 characterized	 by	 the	 Financial	Accounting	Standards	Board	(FASB)	and	researchers	as	“performance	statements.”		Previously,	the	majority	of	firms	presented	CI	and	OCI	in	the	equity	statement;	thus,	issuance	of	ASU	2011-05	led	to	a	large	number	of	firms	changing	their	presentation	of	CI	and	OCI	to	the	performance	statements	after	December	2011.			The	FASB	explicitly	highlights	that	a	main	objective	of	this	standard	update	is	to	 increase	 the	 prominence	 of	 CI/OCI,	 and	 therefore	 improve	 the	 transparency	 of	financial	 reporting.	 	 The	more	 prominent	 reporting	 of	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	 performance	statements	likely	promotes	the	role	of	CI	as	a	performance	measure,	thus	reducing	managers’	incentives	to	manage	the	realization	of	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities,	as	these	realized	gains	and	losses	only	affect	the	value	of	net	income	(NI)	but	not	the	value	of	CI.	 	Accordingly,	 I	expect	the	enactment	of	ASU	2011-05	reduces	earnings	
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management	using	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities.1	Prior	 empirical	 studies	 (Lee	 et	 al.,	 2006;	 Bamber	 et	 al.,	 2010)	 examine	 the	determinants	of	 the	 firm	choice	 to	present	CI/OCI	 in	 the	equity	statements	versus	the	 performance	 statements.	 	 Both	 papers	 document	 that	 the	main	 driver	 of	 this	choice	 is	 managers’	 tendency	 to	 smooth	 earnings.2		 However,	 it	 remains	 unclear	whether	 eliminating	 the	 equity	 statement	 reporting	 of	 CI/OCI	 reduces	managers’	earnings	 management	 behavior.	 	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 reporting	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	performance	 statement	 could	 emphasize	 the	 usefulness	 of	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	performance	evaluation,	highlight	 the	difference	between	CI	and	NI,	and	thus	help	reveal	 earnings	 management	 through	 selective	 sales	 of	 AFS	 securities	 (Hirst	 and	Hopkins,	1998;	Lee,	et	al.,	2006).		In	this	case,	rational	managers	would	be	less	likely	to	 engage	 in	 earnings	management,	 if	 they	believe	 the	 changed	 reporting	 leads	 to	higher	 chances	of	detection	 (Fields	 et	 al.,	 2001;	Hirst	 et	 al.,	 2003).	 	Thus,	 I	 expect	that	firms	choosing	to	report	CI/OCI	in	the	equity	statements	before	the	enactment	of	ASU	2011-05	are	more	likely	to	selectively	sell	AFS	securities	to	affect	bottom	line	net	income	in	the	pre-update	period	relative	to	firms	choosing	to	report	CI/OCI	on	a	separate	 statement	 of	 comprehensive	 income.	 	 Further,	 I	 expect	 that	 the	 former	firms	will	 exhibit	 a	 relatively	 greater	 reduction	 in	 earnings	management	 after	 the																																																									1		 Since	 managers	 principally	 influence	 the	 realization	 of	 gains	 and	 losses	 on	 AFS	 securities	through	 the	 sales	 of	 AFS	 securities,	 I	 use	 term	 “realizing	 gains	 and	 losses”,	 “selling	 AFS	securities”,	“realization	of	gains	and	losses”	and	“sales	of	AFS	securities”	interchangeably.		2		 Lee	 et	 al.	 (2006)	 documents	 that	 insurance	 companies	with	 a	 history	 of	managing	 realized	gains	 and	 losses	 to	 smooth	earnings	 are	more	 likely	 to	present	CI/OCI	 in	 equity	 statements	rather	than	performance	statements.		Bamber	et	al.	(2010)	finds	that	firms	with	more	equity-related	CEO	compensation	are	more	likely	to	present	CI/OCI	in	equity	statements.	
		 3	
adoption	of	ASU	2011-05.	 	However,	 if	managers	do	not	believe	 that	changing	 the	reporting	 position	 of	 CI/OCI	 significantly	 increases	 investors’	 ability	 to	 detect	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities,	then	I	will	fail	to	document	any	change	in	earnings	management	behavior.	Using	 hand-collected	 data	 of	 reporting	 positions	 of	 CI/OCI	 for	 a	 sample	 of	bank	 holding	 companies 3 	from	 2010	 to	 2014,	 I	 compare	 banks’	 earnings	management	through	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities	for	those	reporting	CI/OCI	in	the	equity	statements	versus	those	reporting	CI/OCI	in	the	performance	statements.		Following	prior	papers	(Beatty	and	Harris,	1999;	Lee	et	al.,	2006;	Dong	et	al.,	2014;	Barth	et	al.,	2015),	 I	measure	earnings	management	through	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities	using	the	association	between	realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities	and	net	income	before	realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities	after	controlling	for	 the	 other	 firm	 and	 time-series	 effects.	 	 Based	 on	 the	 signs	 of	 the	 association,	earnings	 management	 behaviors	 are	 categorized	 as	 either	 earnings	 smoothing	(when	 the	association	 is	negative)	or	 “big	bath”	 (when	 the	association	 is	positive)	behaviors.	Using	 ASU	 2011-05	 as	 an	 exogenous	 treatment	 that	 changes	 the	 reporting	position	of	CI/OCI	for	a	large	portion	of	firms,	I	conduct	a	difference-in-differences																																																									3		 I	 focus	on	bank	holding	companies	because:	(i)	the	availability	of	quarterly	bank	regulatory-reports-data	enables	me	to	examine	earnings	management	through	realizing	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	 securities;	 (ii)	 relative	 to	 the	other	 industries,	banks	usually	have	 larger	amounts	of	AFS	securities,	which	gives	them	more	opportunities	to	manage	earnings	through	selectively	selling	AFS	 securities;	 and	 (iii)	 prior	 research	documents	 that	 the	 opportunistic	 sale	 of	AFS	securities	is	a	primary	mechanism	by	which	banks	manage	earnings	on	or	above	the	bottom	line	net	income.	
		 4	
design	 to	 study	 the	 effect	 of	 reporting	 positions	 of	 CI/OCI	 on	 banks’	 earnings	management.	 	 Consistent	with	 expectations,	 empirical	 results	 reveal	 that,	 prior	 to	the	enactment	of	ASU	2011-05,	banks	with	CI/OCI	reported	in	the	equity	statements	exhibit	more	earnings	smoothing	behaviors	through	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities	relative	to	those	reporting	CI/OCI	 in	the	performance	statements.	 	 In	addition,	 the	results	reveal	that	banks	that	previously	report	CI/OCI	in	the	equity	statements	also	experience	a	more	pronounced	decrease	in	this	same	earnings	smoothing	behavior	compared	 to	 those	banks,	which	have	always	 reported	CI/OCI	 in	 the	performance	statements.	 	The	 results	 further	 suggest	 that	 even	after	 adopting	 the	performance	reporting	 of	 CI/OCI,	 banks	 that	 previously	 report	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	 equity	 statements	continue	 to	 exhibit	 significant	 earnings	 smoothing	 behaviors.	 	 I	 fail	 to	 find	 a	significant	 effect	 of	 performance	 reporting	 of	 CI/OCI	 on	 “big	 bath”	 behaviors.		Overall,	 the	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 the	 mandated	 reporting	 of	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	performance	 statement	 mitigates—but	 does	 not	 completely	 eliminate—earnings	smoothing	behavior.		Additional	 tests	 examine	 whether	 the	 documented	 change	 in	 earnings	management	behaviors	following	the	adoption	of	ASU	2011-05	varies	across	certain	cross-sectional	bank	characteristics.	 	 In	particular,	 I	predict	 that	 the	above	 results	should	 be	 accentuated	 for	 firms	 with	 stronger	 monitoring.	 	 Confirming	 this	expectation,	the	results	suggest	that	the	influence	of	ASU	2011-05	is	mainly	on	the	treatment	banks	audited	by	Big	4	firms.		The	results	also	show	that	treatment	banks	with	a	higher	 level	of	analysts	 following	and	 institutional	ownership	exhibit	 fewer	
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earnings	 smoothing	 behaviors	 using	 AFS	 securities	 in	 the	 pre-update	 period,	 and	therefore	are	less	affected	by	ASU	2011-05.	This	study	makes	three	primary	contributions.		It	is	the	first	empirical	study	using	a	natural	experiment	to	examine	how	the	presentation	of	recognized	items	in	different	financial	statements	affects	managers’	earning	management	behaviors.		As	such,	 it	 complements	 prior	 research,	 which	 focuses	 on	 experimental	 settings	 to	examine	 this	 issue	 (e.g.,	 Hirst	 and	 Hopkins	 1998).	 	 The	 presentation	 of	 CI/OCI	studied	 in	 this	 paper	 is	 novel	 because,	 in	 contrast	 with	 previously-examined	presentation	 issues	 (particularly	 recognition	 versus	 disclosure,	 and	 classification	shifting),	 the	 current	 setting	 helps	 to	 isolate	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 presentation	 of	 the	reported	 information	 by	 holding	 constant	 the	 recognition	 of	 the	 information.		Moreover,	the	current	paper	focuses	on	a	presentation	effect,	as	there	is	no	change	on	the	bottom	line	reported	values:	specifically,	bottom	line	NI	is	unaffected	by	ASU	2011-05.		Thus,	the	current	paper	isolates	the	effect	of	the	presentation	decision	on	managers’	earnings	management	behavior.	 	Second,	the	findings	in	this	paper	have	important	policy	implications	to	the	widespread	debate	concerning	the	appropriate	presentation	of	CI/OCI.		In	particular,	the	findings	suggest	that	the	more	prominent	presentation	of	CI/OCI	reduces	earnings	management	behavior.		Finally,	this	paper	adds	 to	 the	 prior	 literature	 on	 earnings	 management	 in	 banks	 (e.g.,	 Beatty	 et	 al.	2002;	Barth	 et	 al.	 2015)	 through	 selective	 sales	of	AFS	 securities	by	documenting	that	financial	statement	presentation	also	affects	this	behavior.			Section	 2	 summarizes	 the	 background	 of	 the	 related	 literature	 and	
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regulations,	and	develops	the	hypotheses.		Section	3	describes	the	research	design.		Section	4	 presents	 the	 sample	 selection	process.	 	 Section	5	 discusses	 the	 primary	empirical	results.	 	Sections	6	and	7	presents	the	supplemental	tests	and	sensitivity	tests.		Section	8	concludes.			
2.		BACKGROUND	AND	HYPOTHESIS	DEVELOPMENT	2.1		Background	and	Literature	Review	2.1.1		The	Performance	Reporting	of	Comprehensive	Income	The	 controversy	 surrounding	 the	 appropriate	 presentation	 of	 CI	 originates	from	 the	 debate	 between	 two	 concepts	 of	 income	 disclosure:	 “all-inclusive”	 and	“current	 operating	 performance.”	 	 Under	 the	 “all-inclusive”	 concept,	 income	reporting	should	cover	all	 the	changes	 in	the	net	assets	during	the	current	period,	except	dividend	distributions	and	transactions	from	the	owner	sources.		In	contrast,	under	the	“current	operating	performance”	concept,	income	excludes	extraordinary	and	 nonrecurring	 gains	 and	 losses.	 	 The	 FASB	 implemented	 the	 reporting	 of	 CI	under	Statement	of	Financial	Accounting	Standard	(SFAS)	130	(FASB,	1997),	which	in	part	encompasses	the	“all-inclusive”	concept.	 	SFAS	130	defines	CI	as	the	sum	of	net	 income	 (NI)	 and	 OCI	 items,	 where	 OCI	 includes	 four	 principle	 components	relating	 to	 the	 fair	 value	 adjustments	 on	 AFS	 securities,	 derivative	 instruments,	foreign	currency	translations,	and	pension	obligations.	SFAS	130	permits	four	alternative	formats	to	report	CI/OCI:	1)	in	the	income	statement	with	 NI;	 2)	 in	 a	 separate	 statement	 of	 comprehensive	 income,	 starting	
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with	NI	and	ending	with	CI	 immediately	 following	the	 income	statement;	3)	 in	the	statement	 of	 changes	 in	 shareholders’	 equity	 (i.e.,	 equity	 statement);	 or	 4)	 in	 a	separate	statement	of	 comprehensive	 income,	 starting	with	NI	and	ending	with	CI	(but	 not	 immediately	 following	 the	 income	 statements).4		 The	 first	 two	 methods	(Method	 1	 and	 2)	 are	 categorized	 by	 the	 FASB	 and	 academic	 researchers	 as	performance	statements.		Appendix	1	presents	examples	of	reporting	CI/OCI	in	the	performance	statements	(Methods	1	and	2)	and	the	equity	statements	(Method	3).		The	FASB	initially	proposed	only	Methods	1	and	2	in	the	exposure	draft	of	SFAS	130,	since	OCI	items	should	be	considered	as	part	of	firm’s	financial	performance	when	the	“all-inclusive”	concept	is	applied.		However,	Methods	3	and	4	were	later	allowed	into	 SFAS	 130	 because	 of	 the	 opposing	 views	 to	 the	 performance	 reporting	 of	CI/OCI	 expressed	 by	 financial	 statement	 preparers	 during	 the	 public	 comment	period.		In	particular,	opponents	of	performance	reporting	of	CI/OCI	believe	that	the	unrealized	gains	and	losses	in	OCI	are	out	of	managers’	control,	and	thus	should	not	be	used	for	performance	evaluation	(Yen	et	al.,	2007).		Maines	and	McDaniel	(2000)	documents	 that	 90	percent	 of	 the	 comment	 letters	 on	 the	proposed	draft	 of	 SFAS	130	 support	 a	 disclosure	 of	 CI	 in	 the	 equity	 statements	 or	 footnotes.	 	 Consistent	with	 this	 viewpoint,	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 companies	 present	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	 equity	
																																																								4			Before	 the	 enactment	 of	 ASU	 2011-05,	 the	 FASB	 did	 not	 require	 that	 statements	 of	comprehensive	 income	 be	 reported	 following	 the	 income	 statements.	 	 Thus,	 some	 firms	present	 CI/OCI	 in	 a	 separate	 statement	 of	 comprehensive	 income	 following	 the	 equity	statement	 or	 the	 statement	 of	 cash	 flow	 under	 SFAS	 130.	 	 However,	 this	 presentation	 (i.e.,	Method	4)	is	rarely	used,	and	thus	excluded	from	the	analyses	in	this	paper.	
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statement	(Method	3)	after	the	enactment	of	the	SFAS	130.5			In	2011,	the	FASB	eliminated	the	options	of	Methods	3	and	4	in	ASU	2011-05;	this	 change	 was	 done	 to	 enhance	 the	 transparency	 of	 CI/OCI,	 and	 thus	 increase	investors’	 usage	 of	 this	 information.	 	 Therefore,	 in	 response	 to	 ASU	 2011-05,	 the	majority	of	companies	switched	their	reporting	position	of	CI/OCI	 from	the	equity	statements	 (Method	 3)	 to	 the	 performance	 statements	 (Methods	 1	 and	 2)	 in	 the	fiscal	periods	after	December	2011.			Experimental	 studies	 find	 that	 both	 professional	 and	 nonprofessional	investors	 are	more	 likely	 to	 incorporate	CI/OCI	 information	 into	 the	performance	evaluation	when	these	elements	are	presented	in	the	performance	statements	(Hirst	and	Hopkins,	1998;	Maines	and	McDaniel,	2000).	 	Hirst	 and	Hopkins	 (1998)	 finds	that	 buy-side	 analysts	 can	 detect	 earnings	management	 through	 selective	 sales	 of	AFS	 securities	 only	 when	 CI/OCI	 are	 reported	 in	 a	 separate	 statement	 of	comprehensive	 income	 (Method	2),	 but	 fail	 to	do	 so	when	presented	 in	 an	 equity	statement	 (Method	 3).	 	 Maines	 and	 McDaniel	 (2000)	 finds	 that	 non-professional	accounting	 information	 users	 only	 consider	 the	 volatility	 of	 unrealized	 gains	 and	losses	 on	 AFS	 securities	 when	 it	 is	 presented	 in	 a	 separate	 statement	 of	comprehensive	 income	(Method	2).	 	However,	contrary	 to	 the	above	experimental	papers,	empirical	studies	fail	to	find	that	performance	reporting	of	CI/OCI	increases	
																																																								5		 Bamber	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 finds	 that	 about	 80%	 of	 S&P	 500	 firms	 report	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	 equity	statements.	 	 Jordan	 and	 Clark	 (2011)	 documents	 that	 about	 63%	 of	 financial	 service	companies	report	CI/OCI	in	the	equity	statements.	
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investors’	 attention	 to	 this	 information	 (Cahan	et	al.,	2000;	Chambers	et	al.,	2007;	Schaberl	and	Victoravich	2015).6			2.1.2	Managing	Earnings	through	Selective	Sales	of	AFS	Securities	Earnings	management	 through	 selective	 sales	 of	 investment	 securities	 has	been	documented	by	many	studies	of	financial	institutions,	especially	those	focusing	on	the	banking	industry	(e.g.	Barth	et	al.	1990;	Beatty	et	al.	1995;	Collins	et	al.,	1995	and	Beatty	et	al.,	2002).		Using	a	sample	period	and	data	after	investment	securities	are	 categorized	 by	 SFAS	 115,	 Barth	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 and	Dong	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 examine	earnings	management	 through	 realizing	 gains	 and	 losses	 on	AFS	 securities.	 	 Both	papers	argue	that	among	all	three	types	of	investment	securities	defined	under	SFAS	115,	only	AFS	securities	would	be	used	to	strategically	time	the	realization	of	gains	and	losses	to	affect	NI.	 	Specifically,	under	the	provisions	of	SFAS	115	and	130,	the	unrealized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities	cannot	be	recognized	into	NI	until	the	security	is	sold,	disposed	or	the	impairment	is	deemed	other-than-temporary.		Thus,	firms’	decisions	regarding	when	to	sell	AFS	securities	(and	which	AFS	securities	to	sell)	determine	when	and	which	part	of	 the	difference	between	 the	 fair	value	and	the	purchase	value	of	AFS	securities	is	recognized	into	NI.7,	8			
																																																								6		 Chambers	 et	 al.	 (2007)	 and	 Schaberl	 and	 Victoravich	 (2015)	 find	 OCI	 items	 more	 value	relevant	when	presented	in	the	equity	statements	versus	in	the	performance	statements.		Both	papers	 suggest	 that	 investors	 are	more	 likely	 to	 use	 the	 accounting	 information	when	 it	 is	reported	in	the	expected	location	based	on	the	firms’	reporting	history. 7			The	realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities	examined	in	this	paper	is	a	measure	reported	in	FR	Y-9C,	which	 includes	net	 gain	or	 loss	 realized	 from	 the	 sale,	 exchange,	 redemption	or	retirement	of	all	AFS	securities.		This	value	also	includes	Other-Than-Temporary	Impairments	
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Managing	earnings	using	AFS	securities	could	be	less	costly	than	engaging	in	accrual	 earnings	 management	 or	 other	 types	 of	 real	 earnings	 management,	 and	consequently	attractive	 to	managers.	 	 First,	managers	 can	 influence	 realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities	mainly	through	sales	of	AFS	securities,	which	are	real	business	decisions	and	not	as	subject	 to	outside	scrutiny	as	accruals	management.		Second,	compared	to	other	real	earnings	management	tools,	the	real	effect	of	selling	AFS	 securities	 can	be	 easily	mitigated	by	 repurchasing	 the	 securities	 shortly	 after	sales.	 Managers	 have	 incentives	 to	 selectively	 sell	 AFS	 securities	 only	 if	 they	believe	that	NI	is	the	earnings	target	but	CI	is	not.		If	CI	is	the	main	earnings	target	for	managers,	there	is	no	need	to	engage	in	this	kind	of	earnings	management,	as	CI	is	unaffected	by	realizing	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities.	 	However,	in	practice,	most	equity	 investors	and	managers	view	NI	or	 the	 income	 items	above	NI	as	 the	primary	performance	measures.	 	Prior	research	provides	evidence	consistent	with	this	 notion.	 	 Barton	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 finds	 that	 the	 core	 operating	 income	 or	 the	earnings	 measures	 above	 the	 bottom	 line	 of	 NI	 are	 more	 value	 relevant	 than	 CI.		Jones	 and	 Smith	 (2011)	 finds	 a	 weaker	 stock	 response	 to	 OCI	 than	 to	 earnings																																																																																																																																																																						(OTTI)	 on	 AFS	 securities.	 	 I	 assume	 that	managers	 have	 to	 trade	 AFS	 securities	 to	manage	earnings	 through	 realizing	 gains	 or	 losses,	 since	 OTTI	 and	 reclassifying	 AFS	 to	 the	 other	securities	are	generally	rare	in	my	sample.	8		Unlike	AFS	securities,	held-to-maturity	securities	are	measured	at	amortized	cost;	further,	the	selling	or	reclassifying	of	held-to-maturities	to	the	other	categories	prior	to	maturity	are	strictly	restricted	by	regulators.		In	addition,	the	fair	value	changes	on	the	trading	securities	are	always	recognized	into	NI,	which	leaves	no	motivation	for	managers	to	manage	NI	through	realizing	gains	and	losses	on	trading	securities.		Reclassifying	AFS	securities	into	trading	securities	requires	recording	realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities,	same	as	for	selling	AFS	securities.		
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before	extraordinary	 items.	 	Dong	et	al.	 (2014)	examines	 the	valuation	of	 the	 fair-value-accounting	 of	 AFS	 securities	 in	 the	 banking	 industry.	 	 They	 find	 equity	investors	place	higher	valuations	on	the	realized	(relative	to	unrealized)	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities.		As	such,	managers	have	incentives	to	recognize	more	gains	and	fewer	losses	on	AFS	securities	when	they	want	to	increase	NI,	and	to	recognize	more	losses	and	fewer	gains	on	AFS	securities	when	they	want	to	save	the	gains	for	the	 future.	 	 Barth	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 finds	 that	 banks’	 realized	 gains	 and	 losses	 on	AFS	securities	 are	 negatively	 associated	 with	 quarterly	 earnings	 and	 quarterly	regulatory	capital	ratios	before	realized	gains	and	losses,	suggesting	that	banks	are	using	 realized	 gains	 and	 losses	 on	 AFS	 securities	 to	 smooth	 earnings	 and	 capital	ratios.	 	2.1.3	Comprehensive	Income	Reporting	and	Selective	Sales	of	AFS	Securities		The	 accounting	 nature	 of	 AFS	 securities	 summarized	 above	 links	 the	detection	of	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities	to	the	performance	reporting	of	CI/OCI.		Since	 CI	 is	 unaffected	 by	 the	 selective	 sales	 of	 AFS	 securities,	 the	 discrepancy	between	CI	and	NI	reveals	the	effect	of	such	decisions.	 	Thus,	equity	investors	may	better	detect	earnings	management	through	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities	if	CI	is	in	a	more	salient	position,	highlighting	the	discrepancy	between	CI	and	NI.9	
																																																								9	 Among	 all	 four	 OCI	 items,	 only	 adjustments	 on	 AFS	 securities	 and	 pension	 plan	 are	documented	 to	 be	 related	 to	 earnings	 management	 behaviors.	 	 Emphasizing	 CI	 and	 OCI	components	 may	 not	 be	 very	 helpful	 in	 detecting	 pension-related	 earnings	 managements,	which	are	usually	achieved	by	changing	several	pension	assumptions.		Thus,	my	study	mainly	
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Hirst	 and	 Hopkins	 (1998)	 and	 Maines	 and	 McDaniel	 (2000)	 argue	 that	reporting	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	 performance	 statements	 increases	 equity	 investors’	attention	 on	 CI/OCI	 by	 signaling	 the	 usefulness	 of	 CI/OCI	 information	 in	 the	performance	 evaluation,	 as	well	 as	 emphasizing	 the	 link	 between	 CI	 and	NI.	 	 The	statement	 of	 changes	 in	 shareholders’	 equity	 is	 mainly	 used	 to	 demonstrate	 the	distribution	 of	 shareholder’s	 equity	 rather	 than	 the	 firms’	 performance	 in	 the	current	period.		In	particular,	reporting	CI/OCI	in	the	equity	statements	with	other	non-performance-related	financial	information	not	only	implies	that	CI/OCI	are	not	relevant	to	the	performance	evaluation	but	also	makes	CI/OCI	information	difficult	to	extract.	Earnings	management	behaviors	that	are	easy	to	detect	not	only	 fail	 to	fool	equity	investors,	but	also	may	dampen	firms’	stock	price	(Lundholm	1999;	Hirst	et	al.	2003).	 	Thus,	managers,	who	intend	to	selectively	sell	AFS	securities	to	manage	earnings	would	 avoid	 using	 performance	 reporting	 of	 CI/OCI,	 if	 they	 believe	 such	reporting	 increases	 the	 chance	 for	 investors	 to	detect	 their	 earnings	management	behaviors.		Two	empirical	studies	(Lee	et	al.	2006;	Bamber	et	al.	2010)	examine	the	determinants	 of	 firms’	 choice	 of	 equity	 statements	 over	 income	 statements	 or	separate	comprehensive	income	statements	to	report	CI/OCI.		Lee	et	al.	(2006)	finds	that	 insurers	 with	 a	 history	 of	 “cherry	 picking”	 realized	 gains	 and	 losses	 on	investment	 securities	 and	 lower	 disclosure	 quality	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 choose	 the	
																																																																																																																																																																					examines	 the	 effect	 of	 reporting	 position	 of	 CI	 on	 earnings	 managements	 through	 AFS	securities.	
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equity	 statement	 to	 report	 CI/OCI.	 	 Bamber	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 finds	 firms	 with	 more	equity	 incentives	 in	 their	 CEO	 compensation	 are	more	 likely	 to	 choose	 the	 equity	statement	to	report	CI/OCI.		However,	the	evidence	in	these	papers	does	not	directly	answer	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 mandating	 the	 reporting	 of	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	performance	 statements	 decreases	 earnings	 management	 using	 selective	 sales	 of	AFS	securities.		2.2		Hypotheses	This	paper	investigates	whether	reporting	CI/OCI	in	the	different	statements	affects	 banks’	 earnings	 management	 through	 selective	 sales	 of	 AFS	 securities.	 	 I	focus	on	the	banking	industry	for	two	reasons.		First,	relative	to	the	other	industries,	banks	 have	 larger	 amounts	 of	 AFS	 securities,	 which	 affords	 the	 banks	 more	flexibility	to	use	these	financial	instruments	(opportunistically)	to	achieve	reporting	objectives.10		 As	 such,	 earnings	 management	 through	 selective	 sales	 of	 AFS	securities	primarily	occurs	in	the	banking	setting	(e.g.,	Barth	et	al.,	2015;	Dong	et	al.,	2014).	 	 Second,	 the	 availability	 of	 AFS-securities-related	 data	 in	 Bank	 Regulatory	database	enables	me	to	examine	this	type	of	earnings	management	behavior.	I	use	 the	enactment	of	ASU	2011-05	as	an	exogenous	event	 to	measure	 the	influence	of	 the	performance	 reporting	of	CI/OCI	on	banks’	 earnings	management	
																																																								10			For	the	public	banks	sample	 in	my	paper,	AFS	securities	account	 for	18%	of	total	assets	on	average.	 	Of	note,	I	do	not	find	significant	changes	in	the	AFS	securities	level	during	my	test	period.	
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behavior.11		 Following	 Lee	 et	 al.	 (2006)	 and	 Bamber	 et	 al.	 (2010),	 relative	 to	 the	banks	 with	 CI/OCI	 presented	 in	 the	 performance	 statements,	 I	 predict	 that	 the	banks	 presenting	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	 equity	 statement	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 engage	 in	earnings	management	through	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities	before	adopting	ASU	2011-05.	 	 This	 prediction	 follows	 because	 these	 banks	 either	 (a)	 have	 more	opportunity	 to	 do	 so	 or	 (b)	 their	 accounting	 choices	 reflect	 their	 incentives	 to	manage	earnings.12		Thus,	my	first	hypothesis	is	(stated	in	an	alternative	form):	
H1:		 Prior	 to	 the	 adoption	 of	 ASU	 2011-05,	 banks	 presenting	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	equity	statement	engage	in	more	earnings	management	through	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities	relative	 to	banks	presenting	CI/OCI	 in	 the	 income	statement	or	a	separate	statement	following	the	income	statement.	My	main	research	interest	 is	assessing	whether	the	mandated	switch	under	ASU	 2011-05	 from	 reporting	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	 equity	 statements	 to	 the	 performance	statements	reduces	the	management	of	realizing	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities.		Rational	 managers	 would	 be	 less	 likely	 to	 engage	 in	 this	 earnings	 management	behavior	 if	 it	 is	believed	to	have	a	higher	chance	of	detection.	 	Restated,	 the	more																																																									11		ASU	2011-05	also	 suggests	a	 reporting	 reclassification	adjustment	with	both	OCI	and	NI	 in	the	 performance	 statements.	 	 However,	 this	 requirement	 was	 retracted	 later	 in	 the	 same	year.	 	 In	 my	 sample,	 most	 banks	 always	 report	 1)	 gains	 and	 losses	 from	 sales	 of	 AFS	securities,	 2)	 other	 than	 temporary	 impairment	 on	 AFS	 securities	 and	 3)	 any	 adjustments	from	 reclassifying	 AFS	 securities	 to	 other	 securities,	 the	 sum	 of	 which	 are	 basically	 the	reclassification	adjustment	currently	presented	under	OCI,	in	the	income	statements	as	non-interest	income	items.		For	my	sample	banks,	the	main	effect	of	ASU	2011-05	is	changing	the	reporting	position	of	CI/OCI	from	the	equity	statements	to	the	performance	statements.	12		 In	 this	 paper,	 I	 treat	 both	 one-single-statement	 reporting	 and	 two	 separate	 statements	reporting	as	performance	reporting.	In	my	sample,	only	8	banks	used	one-single-statement	to	reporting	CI/OCI	before2012.	9	banks	started	to	use	one-single-statement	in	2012.		But	only	15	firms	in	total	used	one-single-statement	in	2012,	and	reduce	to	11	firms	after	2012.	
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prominent	 presentation	 of	 CI/OCI	 increases	 the	 expected	 costs	 and	 reduces	 the	expected	 benefits	 of	 engaging	 in	 this	 earnings	 management	 behavior.	 	 Thus,	 if	managers	believe	 that	presenting	CI/OCI	 in	 the	performance	statements	 increases	the	chance	of	 related	earnings	management	being	detected	 (as	 suggested	by	Hirst	and	Hopkins,	1998),	 they	would	reduce	such	earnings	management	after	adopting	ASU	2011-05.			Most	firms	are	required	by	ASU	2011-05	to	switch	their	reporting	position	of	OCI	 in	 their	 fiscal	 year	 2012,	 except	 the	 firms	 that	 voluntarily	 present	 OCI	 in	 the	performance	statements	prior	to	the	enactment	of	ASU	2011-05.		Thus,	I	predict	that	ASU	 2011-05	 only	 reduces	 management	 of	 realized	 gains	 and	 losses	 on	 AFS	securities	 for	 banks	 presenting	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	 equity	 statements	 before	 2012	(hereafter	 treatment	 banks);	 that	 is,	 the	 treatment	 banks	 are	 those	 required	 to	switch	 from	 reporting	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	 equity	 statements	 to	 the	 performance	statements.		In	contrast,	I	predict	that	ASU	2011-05	will	not	affect	(or	have	a	smaller	effect	on)	those	banks,	which	always	present	CI/OCI	in	the	performance	statements	(hereafter	 control	 banks).	 	 In	 particular,	 the	 latter	 banks	 are	 not	 changing	 their	presentation	 of	 CI/OCI,	 and	 should	 thus	 exhibit	 no	 change	 in	 the	 expected	 net	benefits	of	this	earnings	management	behavior.		This	leads	to	my	second	hypothesis	(stated	in	an	alternative	form):	
H2:		 Subsequent	to	the	adoption	of	ASU	2011-05,	banks	mandated	to	switch	the	reporting	 position	 of	 CI/OCI	 (treatment	 banks)	 exhibit	 a	 larger	 decline	 in	earnings	management	 through	 selective	 sales	 of	 AFS	 securities	 relative	 to	
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banks	already	presenting	CI/OCI	using	 the	required	position	 in	ASU	2011-05	before	2012	(control	banks).	H2	would	fail	to	be	rejected	if	managers	believe	that	changing	the	reporting	position	of	CI/OCI	will	not	significantly	increase	investors’	ability	to	detect	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities.		The	managers	could	believe	this	for	three	principle	reasons.		First,	 the	differences	between	CI	and	NI	are	usually	viewed	as	 transient	 fair	value	changes	that	are	not	controlled	by	the	managers	and	are	irrelevant	to	the	firms’	and	managers’	 performance.	 	 Yen	 et	 al.	 (2007)	 examines	 278	 comment	 letters	 to	 the	exposure	draft	 of	 SFAS	130,	 of	which	93	are	 from	banks.	 	 70%	of	 these	 comment	letters	 oppose	 the	 view	 that	 CI	 is	 a	 comprehensive	 earnings	 measure	 and	 value	relevant.	 	This	percentage	is	as	high	as	87%	for	all	the	comment	letters	from	large	banks	and	71%	for	the	letters	from	small	banks.			To	 investigate	 whether	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 both	 demand	 and	 supply	 of	 CI	information,	 I	 examine	 the	 proxy	 statements	 of	 all	 the	 banks	 and	 the	 earnings	announcements	statement	of	20%	of	the	banks	randomly	selected	from	my	primary	test	 sample	 (i.e.,	 42	 of	 207).	 	 I	 find	 that	 no	 bank	 includes	 CI	 in	 the	 performance-based	compensation	package,	while	net	income	per	share	is	always	included	as	the	main	 performance	 measure.	 	 Similarly,	 I	 fail	 to	 find	 any	 banks	 that	 disclose	comprehensive	income	per	share	in	their	earnings	announcements.			Second,	 changing	 the	 reporting	 position	 of	 CI/OCI	 does	 not	 significantly	affect	the	role	of	bottom	line	net	income	as	the	main	performance	measure.		I	find	no	increase	in	the	usage	of	CI	in	either	the	manager	compensation	package	or	earnings	
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announcements	after	the	enactment	of	ASU	2011-05.		In	other	words,	changing	the	reporting	position	of	CI/OCI	may	not	significantly	affect	investors’	attentiveness	to	the	earnings	measures	above	CI.			Third,	 earnings	 management	 using	 selective	 sales	 of	 AFS	 securities	 affects	earnings	 through	 real	 operating	decisions	 –	when	 to	 sell	 the	 securities	 and	which	securities	 to	 sell.	 	 Distinguishing	 between	 business-driven	 sales	 of	 securities	 and	opportunistic	sales	of	securities	could	be	very	difficult	for	the	investors	even	when	CI/OCI	 information	 is	 emphasized.	 	 According	 to	 the	 survey	 paper	 Dichev	 et	 al.	(2013),	CFOs	believe	 that	earnings	managements	 through	real	actions	are	difficult	to	detect	by	outside	analysts.			
3.		RESEARCH	DESIGN	The	paper	 uses	 a	 difference-in-differences	 research	design.	 	 In	 particular,	 I	define	a	bank	as	a	treatment	bank	if	it	presents	CI/OCI	in	the	equity	statement	prior	to	 the	 enactment	 of	 ASU	 2011-05	 (i.e.,	 in	 the	 pre-update	 period),	 and	 thus	 must	switch	to	reporting	CI/OCI	in	the	performance	statements	in	response	to	ASU	2011-05.	 	Similarly,	 I	define	a	bank	as	a	control	bank	 if	 it	 always	presents	CI/OCI	 in	 the	performance	statement,	and	thus	is	unaffected	by	ASU	2011-05.			In	 the	 primary	 tests,	 earnings	 management	 through	 AFS	 securities	 is	measured	based	on	the	relation	between	realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities	and	net	income	before	realized	gains	and	losses.		Beatty	and	Harris	(1999),	Lee	et	al.	(2006),	Dong	et	al.	(2014)	and	Barth	et	al.	(2015)	suggest	that	this	association,	when	
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negative,	captures	earnings	smoothing	behaviors.13			I	follow	Barth	et	al.	(2015)	and	estimate	the	following	model	with	quarterly-data14:	!"#$,& = (	*+,!$,& + ./012/3452657389 + :62;:6<8=>??8@19					 (1a)	!"#$,&	is	 realized	 gains	 or	 losses	 on	 AFS	 securities.	 	*+,!$,&	is	 net	 income	 before	realized	gains	or	losses	on	AFS	securities,	taxes	and	extraordinary	items.	 	Both	are	scaled	by	the	beginning	of	quarter	total	assets.		With	other	firm	level	characteristics	and	 macroeconomic	 factors	 controlled,	 a	 negative	 and	 significant	 β	 indicates	earnings	smoothing	behavior	through	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities.	Barth	et	al.	(2015)	documents	that	when	banks’	earnings	are	extremely	low,	banks	are	more	likely	to	take	a	“big	bath”	rather	than	to	smooth	earnings.		Because	β	would	be	positive	and	significant	when	banks	are	reducing	realized	gains	to	take	a	“big	bath”,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 separate	 this	 kind	of	 earnings	management	 from	 the	
																																																								13		Numerous	studies	argue	that	banks	have	incentives	to	smooth	their	earnings.	 	For	example,	Barth	et	al.	(1995)	and	Gebhardt	et	al.	(2001)	suggest	that	bank	managers	have	incentives	to	reduce	 earnings	 volatility	 to	 decrease	 the	 risk	 premium.	 	 Similarly,	 Kanagaretnam	 et	 al.	(2003)	and	Kanagaretnam	et	al.	(2004)	find	that	bank	managers	smooth	earnings	to	increase	job	security	and	for	external	financing	concerns.	Beatty	and	Harris	(1999)	finds	evidence	that	public	 banks	 smooth	 earnings	 to	 reduce	 information	 asymmetry,	while	 Barth	 et	 al.	 (2015)	finds	 no	 evidence	 supporting	 this	 conclusion.	 	 Prior	 studies	 document	 earnings	 smoothing	behaviors	 in	the	banking	industry	for	decades	(e.g.,	Greenawalt	and	Sinkey	1988;	Beaver	et	al.	1989;	Barth	et	al.	1990;	Scholes	et	al.	1990;	Wahlen,	1994;	Beatty	et	al.,	1995;	Collins	et	al.,	1995;	Barth	et	al.,	1995;	Kanagaretnam	et	al.,	2003;	Kanagaretnam	et	al.,	2004;	Liu	and	Ryan,	2006;	Kilic	et	al.,	2012;	Barth	et	al.	2015).	 	Among	these,	several	papers	document	earnings	smoothing	behaviors	through	realization	of	securities	(Barth	et	al.	1990;	Beatty	et	al.	1995;	Collins	et	al.	1995;	Barth	et	al.	2015).	14			Some	prior	papers	(e.g.	Bartov,	1993)	find	that	firms	sell	assets	in	the	4th	quarter	to	manage	earnings.		In	my	sample,	I	find	that	the	realized	gains	and	losses	in	the	4th	quarter	(mean=0.0008)	is	generally	smaller	than	those	in	the	prior	quarters	(average	mean=0.00013).		The	discretionary	realized	gains	and	losses	that	calculated	in	Section	6.3	are	not	significantly	different	across	four	quarters.	
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more	 popular	 earnings	 smoothing	 behavior.	 	 Since	 most	 bank-quarters	 in	 my	sample	have	positive	 earnings	before	 realized	 gains	 and	 losses	 (only	323	of	 4064	bank-quarters	 have	*+,!$,&	<	 0;	 of	 these,	 145	 occur	 in	 2010),	 I	 assume	 that	most	banks	have	earnings	targets	on	or	above	zero	and	when	banks	cannot	meet	the	zero	target	 they	 are	more	 likely	 to	 take	 a	 “big	 bath”	 rather	 than	 to	 increase	 earnings.		Therefore,	I	predict	that	banks	are	more	likely	to	take	a	big	bath	if	*+,!$,&	<	0	and	do	not	have	sufficient	accumulated	unrealized	gains	and	losses	at	the	beginning	of	quarter	 to	 offset	 the	 negative	*+,!$,& .	 	 Accordingly,	 Equation	 (1a)	 can	 be	transformed	into:	!"#$A = (BC;//1ℎ*+$A + (E,6F751ℎ*+$A + (G+0=C;//1ℎ$A							+./012/3452657389 + :62;:6<8=>??8@19		 (1b)	C;//1ℎ*+$A 	equals	*+,!$A 	if	*+,!$A 	>	 0	 or	*+,!$A+	AUGLq-1	>	 0,	 and	 0	 otherwise.		,6F751ℎ*+$A 	equals	*+,!$A 	if	*+,!$A 	<	0	and	*+,!$A+	AUGLq-1	<	0,	and	0	otherwise.	+0=C;//1ℎ$A	equals	 1	 if	*+,!$A 	>	 0	 or	*+,!$A+	 AUGLq-1	>	 0,	 and	 0	 otherwise.	 	 A	negative	 and	 significant	 β1	 indicates	 earnings	 smoothing	 behaviors	 through	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities,	and	a	positive	and	significant	β2	indicates	“big	bath”	behaviors	through	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities.		To	test	H1	and	H2,	 I	 interact	 indicator	variables	of	 treatment	banks	(Treat)	and	post-update	period	(POST)	with	earnings	items	in	Equation	(1b).		Thus,	for	the	primary	analyses	I	estimate	Equation	(2):	!"#$A = 	(BC;//1ℎ*+$A + (E,6F751ℎ*+$A	
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+	(GH2851×C;//1ℎ*+$A + (JH2851	×,6F751ℎ*+$A	+	(KLMCH×C;//1ℎ*+$A + (NLMCH×,6F751ℎ*+$A	+	(OH2851×LMCH×C;//1ℎ*+$A + (PH2851×LMCH×,6F751ℎ*+$A	+	(QRS"#$,ATB + (BU!8F.5V$A + (BBR:C$A + (BEH>WA + (BG4+XA	+	(BJLMCH + (BKH2851×LMCH + (BN+0=C;//1ℎ$A 	+	(BOH2851×+0=C;//1ℎ$A + (BPLMCH×+0=C;//1ℎ$A 	+	(BQH2851×LMCH×+0=C;//1ℎ$A + :6<8=>??8@19	 (2)	If	 realized	 gains	 and	 losses	 on	 AFS	 securities	 are	 used	 to	 smooth	 earnings,	 then	
S;//1ℎ*+$A 	will	have	a	negative	association	with	!"#$A .		If	managers	selectively	sell	AFS	securities	to	take	a	“big	bath”,	,6F751ℎ*+$A 	will	have	a	positive	association	with		!"#$A .	 	 I	 predict	 that	 treatment	 banks	 have	more	 earnings	management	 through	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities	 in	 the	pre-update	period	relative	 to	control	banks	(H1);	that	is,	β3	is	predicted	to	be	negative,	and	β4	to	be	positive.		I	also	predict	that	treatment	 banks	 have	 a	 more	 pronounced	 decrease	 in	 selective	 sales	 of	 AFS	securities	 after	 the	 enactment	 of	 ASU	 2011-05	 (H2);	 that	 is,	 β7	is	 predicted	 to	 be	positive,	and	β8	to	be	negative.	I	 include	 three	 variables	 to	 control	 for	 the	 other	 determinants	 of	!"#$A .				RS"#$,ATB	is	 accumulated	 unrealized	 gains	 or	 losses	 on	 AFS	 securities	 at	 the	beginning	 of	 the	 quarter	 scaled	 by	 lagged	 total	 assets.	 	 I	 expect	RS"#$,ATB	to	 be	positively	 and	 significantly	 associated	 with	!"#$A .	 	 To	 control	 for	 the	 banks’	incentives	 to	manipulate	 regulatory	 capital	 ratios,	 I	 include	 banks’	 end	 of	 quarter	
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capital	 ratio	 (!8F.5V$A),	 calculated	 as	 the	 sum	 of	 allowable	 Tier	 1	 and	 Tier	 2	regulatory	capital	before	realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities	and	after	taxes	scaled	 by	 the	 risk-weighted	 assets.	 	 The	 predicted	 association	 is	 negative.	 	R:C$A ,	which	represents	the	total	AFS	securities	 in	 fair	value	scaled	by	the	total	assets,	 is	included	 to	 control	 for	 the	 size	 of	 bank’s	 AFS	 securities.	 	 Following	 Barth	 et	 al.	(2015),	I	include	the	proxy	of	implied	volatility	of	options	on	the	S&P500	Index	(i.e.	
VIX	 proxy)	 and	 the	 TED	 spread	 proxy	 (calculated	 as	 the	 difference	 between	 the	three-month	 LIBOR	 and	 the	 three-month	 T-bill	 interest	 rate)	 to	 control	 for	 the	macroeconomic	 factors.	 	 Firm	 fixed	 effects	 are	 included	 to	 control	 for	 the	 firm	average	realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities.				
4.	SAMPLE	SELECTION		4.1.	Sample	Selection	Process	I	base	my	sample	mainly	on	the	bank	holding	companies	registered	with	U.S.	Federal	 Reserve	 Bank	 of	 Chicago	 in	 the	 Bank	Regulatory	Database	 (WRDS).	 	 This	provides	 quarterly	 accounting	 data	 from	 forms	 filed	 by	 the	 regulated	 depository	financial	 institutions.	 	The	main	variables	of	 interest	 are	 realized	gains	and	 losses	and	unrealized	holding	gains	and	 losses	on	AFS	securities.	 	To	study	the	reporting	position	 of	 CI/OCI,	 I	 require	 banks	 to	 have	 CIK	 codes	 to	 collect	 the	 reporting	position	data	of	CI/OCI	in	the	10-K	and	10-Q	filings	from	the	SEC	EDGAR	system.			Most	 firms	 do	 not	 switch	 the	 reporting	 position	 of	 CI/OCI	 from	 period	 to	period	after	they	are	required	to	start	reporting	CI/OCI	in	1998,	and	always	use	the	
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same	reporting	method	in	both	10-K	and	10-Q	filings.		To	demonstrate,	I	present	the	yearly	 distribution	 of	 reporting	 positions	 of	 CI	 for	 all	 bank	 holding	 companies	registered	with	 SEC	 in	 Table	 1.15		Most	 banks	 present	 CI	 using	 equity	 statements	until	2011.		On	average,	the	percentage	of	performance	statement	users	is	about	21%	of	all	the	sample	banks	from	1998	to	2010.	 	Before	2011,	banks	seldom	switch	the	reporting	position	of	CI.		Most	switches	occur	in	2011	and	2012,	when	ASU	2011-05	is	issued	and	becomes	effective.		 <Table	1>	To	answer	the	research	question	in	this	paper,	I	mainly	focus	on	the	test	period	2010-2014.		I	start	my	test	period	from	2010	to	eliminate	the	influence	of	financial	crisis.		From	2010	to	2014,	I	have	500	unique	bank	holding	companies	with	10-K	and	10-Q	filling	data	available	in	the	SEC	EDGAR	system.			<Table	2>	The	sample	 selection	process	 is	presented	 in	Table	2	Panel	A.	 	To	estimate	the	difference-in-differences	research	design,	I	require	sample	banks	to	have	at	least	two	years	of	data	both	prior	to	and	after	the	enactment	of	ASU	2011-05	to	observe																																																									15		For	the	reporting	position	data	in	Table	1,	I	exclude	29	banks	that	either	did	not	consistently	use	the	same	reporting	method	of	CI	in	their	10-K	and	10-Q	filings	or	have	a	comprehensive	income	statement	 that	does	not	 immediately	 follow	 the	 income	statement.	 	 I	 exclude	 these	banks	 since	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 classify	 them	 as	 either	 Equity	 Statement	Users	 (i.e.	 Method	 3	users)	or	Performance	Statement	Users	(i.e.	Method	1	or	2	Users).		For	each	fiscal	year,	Table	1	demonstrates	the	number	of	firms	presenting	CI	in	the	equity	statements	(Column	1),	the	number	 of	 firms	 presenting	 CI	 in	 the	 performance	 statements	 (Column	 2),	 the	 number	 of	firms	 that	 switched	 the	 reporting	 position	 of	 CI	 from	 the	 performance	 to	 the	 equity	statements	(Column	3),	the	number	of	firms	that	switched	the	reporting	position	of	CI	from	the	equity	to	the	performance	statements	(Column	4)	and	the	total	number	of	sample	banks	(Column5).	 	This	 sample	does	not	 require	 firms	 to	have	 the	 regression	data	 from	the	Bank	Regulatory	Database,	and	therefore	is	larger	than	the	primary	sample	used	for	the	regression	tests	(see	Table	2).	
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changes	in	earnings	management.		I	define	a	bank	as	a	treatment	(control)	bank	if	it	always	 reports	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	 equity	 statements	 (performance	 statements)	 during	their	 fiscal	 year	 2010	 and	 2011.	 	 I	 exclude	 13	 banks	 that	 reported	 CI/OCI	 in	 a	separate	statement	not	 following	the	 income	statement	(Method	416),	and	7	banks	that	 did	 not	 consistently	 use	 the	 same	 reporting	 method	 in	 their	 10-Q	 and	 10-K	filings	prior	 to	ASU	2011-05.	 	 In	 the	main	 tests,	 I	 define	 the	pre-update	period	as	2010–2011,	and	the	post-update	period	as	2012–2014	(to	maximize	the	statistical	power).17		 All	 the	 banks	 are	 required	 by	 ASU	 2011-05	 to	 use	 performance	statements	 (i.e.	 Method	 1	 and	 2)	 in	 their	 fiscal	 year	 start	 after	 Dec	 15th	 2011.	 	 I	exclude	 31	 banks	 that	 adopted	 the	 updates	 early	 in	 2011	 immediately	 after	 the	announcement	of	ASU	2011-05	 in	May	and	5	banks	 that	delayed	their	adoption	of	ASU	2011-05	to	their	fiscal	year	201318.		Finally,	I	require	banks	to	have	necessary	data	available	in	Bank	Regulatory	and	Compustat	database	for	at	least	4	years	from	2010	to	2013.		The	above	process	leads	to	a	final	sample	of	207	banks,	of	which	175	are	treatment	banks	and	32	are	control	banks;	the	primary	regression	analyses	use	4,064	bank-quarters	with	relevant	variables	available.			
																																																								16			As	suggested	in	the	prior	sections,	this	study	focuses	on	the	difference	between	the	reporting	choice	 Method	 3	 (equity	 statements)	 and	 Methods	 1	 and	 2	 (performance	 statements	currently	allowed	under	ASU	2011-05).		17		 In	untabulated	robustness	tests,	I	conduct	the	analyses	using	a	balanced	panel	from	2010–2013;	results	are	similar	to	those	presented	in	Table	6.			18			These	5	banks	can	delay	their	adoption	because	that	ASU	2011-05	requires	all	the	public	firms	to	apply	in	their	fiscal	year	start	after	Dec	15,	2011,	and	these	banks	have	fiscal	year	end	before	December	and	after	May.	
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4.2	Matched	Subsample	One	 concern	 of	 my	 difference-in-differences	 research	 design	 is	 that	 the	treatment	banks	and	the	control	banks	are	not	assigned	randomly.		That	is,	control	banks	voluntarily	choose	to	use	performance	statements	before	2012,	and	therefore	are	not	 affected	by	 the	 treatment	 in	2012	 (i.e.,	ASU	2011-05).	 	Thus,	 the	different	characteristics	 between	 treatment	 and	 control	 banks	 that	 drive	 them	 to	 make	different	 reporting	 decisions	 might	 also	 explain	 observed	 differences	 in	 how	earnings	 management	 behavior	 changes	 following	 the	 exogenous	 event	 of	 ASU	2011-05.		Two	items	mitigate	this	concern.		First,	as	shown	in	Table	1,	firms’	choice	of	the	reporting	position	of	CI	is	(on	average)	sticky:	few	firms	switch	the	reporting	position	of	CI/OCI	since	they	are	required	to	report	CI	 from	1998	under	SFAS	130	until	 they	 are	 mandated	 to	 change	 in	 response	 to	 ASU	 2011-05.	 	 Therefore,	 the	factors	 that	 firms	base	 the	decision	of	 the	reporting	position	of	CI/OCI	on	 in	1998	are	 less	 likely	 to	 be	 the	main	determinants	 of	 firms’	 operations	many	 years	 later.		Second,	 Lee	 et	 al.	 (2006)	 and	 Bamber	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 both	 document	 that	 the	main	determinant	of	firms’	choice	to	report	CI/OCI	in	the	equity	statement	rather	than	the	performance	statements	is	the	tendency	to	smooth	earnings	using	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities.	 	Their	 studies	suggest	 that	 the	popular	use	of	equity	statements	 to	report	CI/OCI	reflects	firms’	incentives	to	manage	earnings,	and	my	study	examines	whether	 firms’	earnings	management	decreases	when	 the	change	 in	 the	 reporting	position	of	CI/OCI	causes	a	possible	increase	in	the	scrutiny	of	this	type	of	earnings	management.	
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Nonetheless,	 to	 further	 mitigate	 the	 concern	 of	 the	 difference	 between	treatment	and	control	banks,	I	also	conduct	regression	analyses	using	a	subsample,	in	 which	 the	 treatment	 banks	 are	 matched	 to	 the	 control	 banks	 based	 on	 the	quarterly	average	long-term	debt	ratio,	market-to-book	ratio,	size,	and	AFS	security	level	(i.e.,	LD,	MTB,	SIZE,	and	AFS)	in	the	pre-update	period	(2010	to	2011).		I	choose	these	 four	matching	variables	because	1)	except	 for	AFS,	 the	other	 three	variables	are	 documented	 determinants	 of	 earnings	 management	 behaviors	 in	 the	 prior	literature;	and	2)	treatment	banks	and	control	banks	significantly	differ	in	the	level	of	AFS	and	SIZE	in	the	pre-period.		The	matching	process	is	presented	in	Table	3;	all	variables	are	defined	in	Appendix	2.			<Table	3>	Since	 the	 treatment	 banks	 (N	 =	 175)	 are	more	 numerous	 than	 the	 control	banks	 (N	 =	 32),	 I	 match	 each	 control	 bank	 to	 a	 treatment	 bank	 with	 the	 closest	average	 quarterly	 LD,	MTB,	 SIZE,	 and	AFS	 in	 the	 pre-update	 period	 (2010–2011)	using	a	Mahalanobis	matching	method.	 	After	matching,	I	have	32	treatment	banks	and	32	control	banks.	 	As	shown	in	Table	3,	treatment	banks	and	control	banks	do	not	exhibit	significant	differences	in	the	matching	variables	in	the	pre-update	period	after	 the	matching.19		 Because	 it	 is	 important	 to	 observe	 the	 changes	 in	 earnings	management	through	AFS	securities	of	the	whole	treatment	banks	sample	after	they																																																									19			Regulatory	 capital	 ratios	 and	 the	 indicator	 variable	 of	 Big	 4	 auditors	 are	 not	 used	 in	 the	matching	process	because	1)	Regulatory	capital	ratios	do	not	significantly	differ	between	the	treatment	 banks	 and	 the	 control	 banks	 in	 the	pre-update	 period;	 and	2)	 the	 proportion	 of	banks	engaging	Big	4	auditors	are	similar	between	the	treatment	banks	(84	of	175)	and	the	control	 banks	 (14	 of	 32).	 	 After	 matching,	 16	 of	 32	 treatment	 firms	 are	 audited	 by	 Big	 4	auditors.	
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are	all	forced	to	change	the	reporting	position	of	CI/OCI,	I	conduct	all	the	difference-in-differences	analyses	with	both	the	whole	sample	(207	banks,	with	175	treatment	and	 32	 control)	 and	 the	 matched	 subsample	 (64	 banks,	 with	 equal	 number	 of	treatment	and	control).		
5.		RESULTS	5.1		Descriptive	Statistics	Table	 4	 compares	 the	 descriptive	 statistics	 between	 treatment	 and	 control	banks	before	and	after	matching.			 <Table	4>	In	general,	the	descriptive	statistics	of	variables	in	Equation	(2)	are	similar	to	those	presented	 in	 Barth	 et	 al.	 (2015).	 	 The	 average	 quarterly	 earnings	 before	 realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities	is	positive,	and	not	significantly	different	between	treatment	 and	 control	 banks.	 	 As	 shown	 in	 Panel	 A,	 in	 general,	 compared	 to	 the	control	banks,	 the	 treatment	banks	are	smaller	with	 less	AFS	securities,	 less	 long-term	 debt,	 less	 institutional	 ownership	 and	 smaller	 capital	 ratios	 before	 realized	gains	and	losses.		Panel	B	presents	the	descriptive	statistics	for	the	treatment	banks	after	the	matching	process;	most	variables	do	not	differ	between	the	treatment	and	the	control	banks,	except	!8F.5V$A 	and	,6F4$A .	 	The	mean	of	!8F.5V$A 	is	about	15%	for	 the	matched	 treatment	banks,	 but	 close	 to	 16%	 for	 the	 control	 banks,	 both	of	which	 are	 much	 higher	 than	 the	 typical	 regulatory	 requirements	 (e.g.,	 8%	 under	Basel	II).		The	portion	of	the	matched	treatment	banks	audited	by	Big	4	firms	is	16	of	
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32,	whereas	that	of	control	banks	is	14	of	32.		<Table	5>	Table	5	presents	Pearson	correlations	 for	both	 the	whole	sample	 (Panel	A)	and	 the	 matched	 subsample	 (Panel	 B).	 	!"#$A 	is	 negatively	 and	 significantly	associated	with	earnings	before	realized	gains	and	losses	(*+,!$A),	consistent	with	banks	using	realized	gains	and	losses	to	smooth	earnings.		As	expected,	!"#$A 	is	also	positively	and	significantly	associated	with	the	beginning	of	the	period	accumulated	unrealized	gains	and	losses	and	total	AFS	securities	level	(RS"#$ATBand	R:C$A).		
	5.2	Difference-in-differences	Analyses	of	Earnings	Management	Through	AFS	Securities	Columns	(1)	and	(2)	in	Table	6	present	the	regression	results	of	Equation	(2)	with	 the	 whole	 sample	 and	 the	 matched	 subsample,	 respectively;	 the	 results	 are	similar	across	the	two	samples.			 <Table	6>	Consistent	 with	 my	 expectations	 and	 the	 results	 in	 Barth	 et	 al.	 (2015),	RS"#$,ATB	is	 positively	 and	 significantly	 associated	 with	!"#$A ,	 and	!8F.5V$A 	is	negatively	 and	 significantly	 associated	 with	!"#$A .	 	 The	 negative	 association	between	!8F.5V$A 	and	!"#$Asuggests	 that	banks	 in	my	 sample	are	using	 selective	sales	of	AFS	securities	to	manage	regulatory	capital	ratios.		I	fail	to	find	evidence	of	control	banks	conducting	earnings	smoothing	or	big	
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bath	 earning	 management	 through	 selective	 sales	 of	 AFS	 securities	 in	 the	 pre-update	 period,	 as	 the	 coefficients	 on	C;//1ℎ*+$A 	and	,6F751ℎ*+$A 	are	 both	insignificant.	 	 I	 also	 fail	 to	 find	 evidence	 that	 control	 banks	 change	 their	 earnings	smoothing	or	big	bath	behaviors	in	response	to	ASU	2011-05,	as	the	coefficients	on	LMCH×C;//1ℎ*+$A 	and	LMCH×,6F751ℎ*+$A 	are	both	insignificant.	However,	 consistent	 with	 expectations,	 I	 do	 find	 that	 the	 coefficients	 on	H2851×C;//1ℎ*+$A 	are	significantly	negative	for	the	whole	sample	(–0.048,	t-stat	=	–2.59)	 and	 the	 matched	 subsample	 (–0.090,	 t-stat	 =	 –3.23).	 	 This	 suggests	 that	treatment	 banks	 exhibit	 significantly	 more	 earnings	 smoothing	 through	 selective	sales	of	AFS	securities	than	control	banks	in	the	pre-update	period.		Results	indicate	that	 the	 sum	 of	 the	 coefficients	 on	C;//1ℎ*+$A 	and	H2851×C;//1ℎ*+$A ,	 which	captures	earnings	smoothing	behavior	for	the	treatment	banks	in	the	pre-period,	is	also	 significantly	 negative	 (–0.066,	 t-stat	 =	 –6.31).	 	 The	 coefficient	 on	H2851	×,6F751ℎ*+$A ,	which	captures	the	difference	between	treatment	and	control	banks	in	“big	 bath”	 in	 the	 pre-update	 period,	 is	 positive	 as	 expected	 but	 not	 significantly	different	 from	 zero.	 	 However,	 the	 sum	 of	 the	 coefficients	 on	,6F751ℎ*+$Aand	H2851×,6F751ℎ*+$A 	in	 the	 regression	 with	 the	 whole	 sample,	which	 captures	 the	“big	bath”	behavior	for	the	treatment	banks	in	the	pre-update	period,	is	positive	and	significant	 (0.006,	 t-stat	 =	 1.97).	 	 Overall	 these	 findings	 support	 H1	 mainly	 on	earnings	smoothing	behavior	but	not	on	“big	bath”	behavior.		Regarding	H2,	coefficients	on	H2851×LMCH×C;//1ℎ*+$A 	and		H2851×LMCH×
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,6F751ℎ*+$A 	obtain	the	expected	signs	for	both	the	whole	sample	and	the	matched	subsample	 regressions.	 	 Significant	 coefficients	 on	H2851×LMCH×C;//1ℎ*+$A 	and		H2851×LMCH×,6F751ℎ*+$A 	support	 the	 inference	 that,	 relative	 to	 control	 banks,	treatment	banks	exhibit	a	more	pronounced	decline	in	earnings	management	using	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities	from	the	pre-	to	the	post-update	period.			Focusing	 on	 the	 whole	 sample,	 treatment	 banks’	 earnings	 smoothing	behavior	 in	 the	 post-update	 period,	 captured	 by	 the	 coefficient	 on	C;//1ℎ*+$A +H2851×C;//1ℎ*+$A + LMCH×C;//1ℎ*+$A + H2851×LMCH×C;//1ℎ*+$A 	(–0.046,	 t-stat	 =	 –4.97),	 remains	 negative,	 but	 significantly	 less	 than	 that	 in	 the	 pre-update	period	(captured	by	the	coefficient	on	C;//1ℎ*+$A + H2851×C;//1ℎ*+$A ,	–0.066,	t-stat=–6.31).	 	The	difference	 is	captured	by	 the	coefficient	on	LMCH×C;//1ℎ*+$A +H2851×LMCH×C;//1ℎ*+$A 	(0.020,	 t-stat	 =	 2.08).	 	 However,	 such	 significant	decrease	 is	 not	 found	 with	 control	 banks	 (captured	 by	 the	 coefficient	 on	LMCH×C;//1ℎ*+$A).	 	 The	 regression	 results	 with	 the	 matched	 subsample	 are	similar.		I	 fail	 to	 find	 significant	 evidence	 of	 “big	 bath”	 behavior	 in	 the	 post-update	period	 with	 both	 the	 whole	 sample	 and	 matched	 subsample.	 	 In	 particular,	 the	coefficient	 on	 ,6F751ℎ*+$A + LMCH×,6F751ℎ*+$A 	and	 the	 coefficient	 on	,6F751ℎ*+$A + H2851×,6F751ℎ*+$A + LMCH×,6F751ℎ*+$A + H2851×LMCH×,6F751ℎ*+$A 	are	both	insignificant.		One	possible	explanation	for	the	weak	results	of	
		 30	
“big	bath”	earnings	management	 is	 the	 lack	of	bank-quarters	exhibiting	extremely	low	earnings.	Figure	1	demonstrates	the	changes	in	earnings	smoothing	behavior,	which	is	captured	by	the	association	coefficients	that	mentioned	above,	from	the	pre-	to	the	post-period	with	 the	whole	sample	 treatment	banks	and	control	banks	separately.		The	solid	columns	represent	significant	earnings	smoothing	behavior	that	find	with	treatment	 banks	 in	 the	 pre-	 and	 the	 post-periods.	 	 The	 dotted	 columns	 represent	insignificant	earnings	smoothing	behavior	that	 find	with	control	banks	 in	both	the	pre-	and	post-update	periods.	 <Figure	1>	Taken	together,	the	results	 in	Table	6	are	consistent	with	H1	and	H2.	 	With	both	the	whole	sample	and	the	matched	subsample,	I	find	that	treatment	banks	have	more	 pronounced	 earnings	 smoothing	 behavior	 through	 selective	 sales	 of	 AFS	securities	 than	 control	 banks	 in	 the	 pre-update	 period	 (H1).	 	 I	 also	 find	 that	treatment	banks	exhibit	a	larger	decrease	in	earnings	smoothing	behavior	after	the	enactment	of	ASU	2011-05,	as	compared	to	control	banks	(H2).		Overall,	my	results	suggest	that	performance	reporting	of	CI/OCI	reduces	firms’	earnings	management	in	this	area,	but	does	not	completely	eliminate	it.		
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6.	SUPPLEMENTAL	ANALYSES		6.1	Other	Concurrent	Events	and	Placebo	Tests	Several	 important	 banking	 industry	 regulation	 changes	 occur	 at	 the	beginning	 of	 my	 test	 period	 (e.g.,	 the	 issuance	 of	 Dodd-Frank	 Act	 and	 the	introduction	of	Basel	III).		As	documented	in	Barth	et	al.	(2015)	and	the	regression	results	 in	 Table	 6,	 banks	 also	 use	 selective	 sales	 of	 AFS	 securities	 to	 manage	regulatory	 capital	 ratios.	 	 Since	 net	 income	 is	 a	 part	 of	 regulatory	 capital,	 it	 is	possible	that	the	decline	in	earnings	management	observed	in	my	study	is	driven	by	the	 increasingly	stringent	capital	 regulations.	 	 In	Basel	 III,	 regulators	modified	 the	definition	 of	 regulatory	 capital	 to	 include	 unrealized	 OCI	 gains	 and	 losses	 in	 the	capital	ratio	calculation.		This	was	done	to	reduce	the	manipulation	of	capital	ratios	through	 selective	 sales	of	AFS	 securities.	 	However,	 this	 change	becomes	effective	for	most	banks	in	2015,	which	is	outside	of	my	test	period.		In	an	additional	analysis	(results	 are	 not	 tabulated),	 I	 fail	 to	 find	 that	 treatment	 or	 control	 banks	 decrease	management	 of	 capital	 ratios,	 as	 captured	 by	 the	 association	 between	!"#$A 	and	!8F.5V$A ,	during	the	test	period.	Several	provisions	of	Dodd-Frank	Act	went	into	effect	during	my	test	period,	which	 may	 increase	 the	 transparency	 of	 banks’	 disclosure	 in	 general	 and	consequently	 reduce	 banks’	 earnings	 management	 through	 AFS	 securities.		However,	 unlike	 other	 earnings	 management	 behaviors,	 the	 selective	 sales	 of	securities	cannot	be	restrained	by	regulators	or	auditors,	and	therefore	is	less	likely	to	be	 affected	by	 the	 increased	 scrutiny.	 	According	 to	my	knowledge,	 there	 is	 no	
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Dodd-Frank	provision	 that	 specifically	 applies	 to	 the	 realization	 of	AFS	 securities.		However,	the	decrease	in	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities	might	still	reflect	the	trend	of	increasing	accountability	and	transparency	in	the	banking	industry,	and	the	trend	might	 be	more	 pronounced	 for	 treatment	 banks,	which	 are	 less	 transparent	 than	control	banks.		To	mitigate	this	concern,	I	conduct	placebo	tests	with	both	the	whole	sample	and	the	matched	subsample.		In	the	placebo	tests,	I	re-estimate	Equation	(2)	with	 the	assumption	that	 the	post-update	period	starts	 in	each	quarter	during	 the	test	period	of	2010	to	2014.		Table	7	presents	the	estimations	of	coefficients	on	the	interaction	terms	with	POST	 in	Equation	(2)	(i.e.	β5,	β6,	β7	and	β8).	 	The	coefficients	on	LMCH×C;//1ℎ*+$A 	and	LMCH×,6F751ℎ*+$A 	capture	the	changes	in	the	selective	sales	 of	 AFS	 securities	 for	 control	 banks	 from	 the	 pre-	 to	 the	 post-update	 period.		The	 coefficients	 on	 H2851×LMCH×C;//1ℎ*+$A 	and	 H2851×LMCH×,6F751ℎ*+$A 	capture	 the	 additional	 changes	 in	 selective	 sales	 of	 AFS	 securities	 for	 treatment	banks	 relative	 to	 control	 banks.	 	 If	 the	 significant	 coefficient	 on	H2851×LMCH×C;//1ℎ*+$A 	observed	in	Table	6	reflects	a	trend	of	increasing	accounting	quality	for	the	treatment	banks,	this	coefficient	would	also	be	significant	and	positive	when	the	post-period	starts	in	quarters	other	than	the	actual	one.		Table	7	shows	the	results	of	the	placebo	tests	with	the	whole	sample	and	the	matched	subsample	respectively.		The	bold	coefficients	and	p-values	represent	coefficients	which	are	significant	at	a	0.05	level	with	one-tailed	t-tests.		Control	banks	do	not	have	observations	with	non-zero	,6F751ℎ*+$A 	after	 2013.	 	 Thus,	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 results	 in	 Table	 7	
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mainly	focuses	on	earnings	smoothing	and	big	bath	behaviors	before	the	4th	quarter	of	2013.	 <Table	7>	The	 results	 in	 Table	 7	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 difference-in-differences	decrease	 in	earnings	smoothing	behaviors	mainly	occurs	 in	2012	(captured	by	the	coefficient	on	H2851×LMCH×C;//1ℎ*+$A),	suggesting	that	this	effect	is	driven	by	an	event	 in	 2012.	 	 Of	 note,	 there	 is	 no	 significant	 difference	 between	 treatment	 and	control	banks’	earnings	smoothing	behaviors	trend	prior	to	2012.		The	coefficient	on	H2851×LMCH×C;//1ℎ*+$A 	is	more	 significant	when	 the	 post-update	 period	 starts	in	 the	second	and	the	 third	quarters	of	2012,	 implying	that	banks	may	need	some	time	 to	 adjust	 their	 earnings	 smoothing	 behaviors.	 	 Taken	 together,	 the	 placebo	tests	 presented	 in	 Table	 7	 support	 H2	 and	 are	 consistent	with	 the	 inference	 that	ASU	 2011-05	 reduces	 earnings	 management	 through	 selective	 sales	 of	 AFS	securities.		6.2	Cross-sectional	Analyses	Table	 6	 documents	 that	 treatment	 banks	 exhibit	 a	 significant	 decrease	 in	earnings	 smoothing	 behaviors	 through	 selective	 sales	 of	 AFS	 securities	 after	applying	 ASU	 2011-05.	 	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 identify	 some	 firm	 characteristics	 that	cause	 the	cross-sectional	variation	 in	 the	 response	 to	ASU	2011-05.	 	 Specifically,	 I	adjust	Equation	 (2)	by	 replacing	Treat	with	 three	 firm-characteristic	 variables:	 (i)	outside	 scrutiny	 measured	 by	 a	 Big	 4	 auditor	 indicator;	 (ii)	 outside	 scrutiny	
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measured	by	the	number	of	analysts	following;	and	(iii)	outside	scrutiny	measured	by	 the	 level	 of	 institutional	 ownership.	 	 I	 estimate	 the	 regressions	 with	 only	treatment	banks	to	explore	whether	treatment	firms’	earnings	smoothing	behaviors	and	 their	 response	 to	 ASU	 2011-05	 significantly	 vary	 with	 these	 three	characteristics.		The	results	are	presented	in	Table	8	Panel	A	to	C.	<Table	8>	The	 results	 in	Table	8	Panel	A	 show	 that	 earnings	 smoothing	 and	big	 bath	behaviors	 do	 not	 differ	 in	 the	 pre-update	 period	 across	 treatment	 banks	 that	 are	audited	 by	 a	 Big	 4	 audit	 firm	 and	 those	 that	 are	 not	 audited	 by	 Big	 4	 auditor.		However,	 treatment	 banks	 that	 are	 audited	 by	 a	 Big	 4	 audit	 firm	 significantly	decrease	 their	 earnings	 smoothing	 behavior	 after	 applying	 ASU	 2011-05.	 	 The	results	suggest	that,	within	the	treatment	banks,	the	decrease	in	earnings	smoothing	behavior	is	mainly	observed	on	banks	that	are	audited	by	Big	4	audit	firms.	The	results	in	Table	8	Panels	B	and	C	show	that	firms	with	significantly	more	analysts	 following	 or	 more	 institutional	 ownership	 tend	 to	 exhibit	 less	 earnings	smoothing	behavior	in	the	pre-period	(captured	by	β3,	which	is	significantly	positive	in	both	Panels	B	and	C),	and	reduce	their	earnings	management	in	response	to	ASU	2011-05	 (captured	by	β7,	which	 is	negative	but	not	 statistically	 significant	 in	both	Panels	B	and	C).		It	 is	worth	mentioning	 that	 coefficient	β8	in	 the	Table	8	 regressions	 is	 very	significant	and	always	has	large	magnitudes.		β8	is	expected	to	capture	the	additional	change	 in	 big	 bath	 behavior	 for	 banks	 that	 are	 audited	 by	Big	 4	 audit	 firms,	with	
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significantly	more	 analysts	 following,	 or	more	 institutional	 ownership.	 	 For	 these	banks,	extremely	low	earnings	in	the	post-update	period	is	actually	very	rare.		Thus,	the	coefficient	β8	in	Table	8	is	mainly	driven	by	a	small	number	of	observations.		6.3	Difference-in-differences	Analyses	of	Discretionary	Realized	Gains	and	Losses		In	 this	 section	 I	 examine	 the	effect	of	CI/OCI	presentation	on	discretionary	realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities.		Several	prior	studies	use	discretionary	realized	gains	and	losses	on	investment	securities	to	measure	earnings	management	through	selectively	selling	AFS	securities	in	the	banking	industry	(e.g.	Beatty	et	al.,	2002;	Cornett	et	al.,	2009	and	Cohen	et	al.,	2014).		I	measure	discretionary	realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities	(DRGL)	based	on	the	Beatty	et	al.	(2002)	model	with	several	extensions.		I	measure	the	normal	portion	of	realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities	as:	!"#$A = sU + sB1/R99819$A + sGRS"#$,ATB + sJ!8F.5V$A + sKR:C$A 	+?62;	?6<8=	8??8@19 + uv521823w	?6<8=	8??8@19 + x$&		 (3)	where	!"#$A ,	RS"#$,ATB,	!8F.5V$A 	and	R:C$A 	are	 as	 previously	 defined.	 	R99819$A 	represents	total	assets.	 	Discretionary	realized	gains	and	losses	(DRGLiq)	is	defined	as	 the	difference	between	actual	!"#$A 	and	“normal”	 realized	gains	and	 losses	 (i.e.	!"#$A − !"#A),	estimated	using	the	whole	sample	(N=4064)20.	I	 examine	 how	 the	 reporting	 position	 of	 CI/OCI	 affects	 both	 signed	discretionary	 realized	 gains	 and	 losses	 (DRGLiq)	 and	 the	 absolute	 value	 of																																																									20		The	adjusted	R-squared	for	the	estimated	regression	of	“normal”	RGL	is	0.175.	
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discretionary	 realized	 gains	 and	 losses	 (i.e.	R79_W!"#$A )	 using	 a	 standard	difference-in-differences	design:	W!"#$A(R79_W!"#$A) = {B + {EH2851$ + {GH2851$×LMCH& + {JLMCH&	+{K#W$A + {N|H,$A+{OC+}>$A + {P,6F4$A 	+{QR:C$A + {BU#/FR053$A + {BB#/F+091$A + x$&	 (4)	where	#W$A 	is	 long-term	 debt	 scaled	 by	 total	 assets,	 and	|H,$A 	represents	 the	market	 to	book	value	 ratio.	 	C+}>$A 	is	 the	natural	 logarithm	of	 total	assets.	 	,6F4$A 	equals	 1	 if	 the	 bank	 is	 audited	 by	 a	 Big	 4	 audit	 firm.	 	#/FR053$A 	represents	 the	natural	 logarithm	of	one	plus	 the	number	of	 average	quarterly	 analysts	 following.		#/F+091$A 	represents	 the	 natural	 logarithm	 of	 one	 plus	 the	 number	 of	 average	quarterly	 institutional	ownership	as	a	percentage	of	 total	shares	outstanding.	 	For	bank-quarters	where	analysts	following	or	institutional	ownership	is	not	available,	I	assume	a	zero	value.		Other	variables	are	as	previously	defined.	In	Equation	(4),	 I	use	H2851$ 	to	capture	the	difference	 in	DRGL	between	the	treatment	and	control	banks	 in	 the	pre-update	period.	 	 I	use	LMCH&	to	 capture	 the	potential	 mean	 shifts	 in	 DRGL	 that	 are	 caused	 by	 other	 events	 during	 the	 test	period21.	 	 The	 coefficient	 on	H2851$×LMCH&	captures	 the	 difference-in-differences	effect.	 	 When	 positive	 (negative)	W!"#$A 	is	 the	 dependent	 variable,	 I	 expect	 the	coefficient	 on	H2851$ 	to	 be	 positive	 (negative)	 and	 significant	 (H1),	 and	 the	coefficient	 on	H2851$×LMCH&	to	 be	 negative	 (positive)	 and	 significant	 (H2).	 	When																																																									21		In	untabulated	tests,	neither	replacing	POST	with	year	fixed	effects	nor	replacing	Treat	with	firm	fixed	effects	changes	my	inferences.	
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R79_W!"#$A 	is	 the	 dependent	 variable,	 I	 expect	 the	 coefficient	 on	H2851$ 	to	 be	positive	 and	 significant	 (H1),	 and	 the	 coefficient	 on	H2851$×LMCH&	to	 be	 negative	and	significant	 (H2).	 	The	estimation	results	of	Equation	 (4)	using	both	 the	whole	sample	and	the	matched	subsample	are	presented	in	Table	9.		<Table	9>	I	 first	 estimate	Equation	 (4)	without	 any	 restrictions	on	net	 income	before	realized	gains	and	losses	and	find	weak	results	supporting	H1	and	H2.		The	results	are	presented	 in	Table	9	Panel	A.	 	 In	 the	whole	sample,	 I	mainly	 find	a	pre-period	difference	and	difference-in-differences	effect	between	treatment	and	control	banks	on	 income-decreasing	DRGL.	 	For	the	matched	sample,	 the	effects	mainly	occur	on	income-increasing	 DRGL.	 	 Then,	 I	 re-estimate	 Equation	 (4)	 using	 only	 the	 bank-quarters	 in	which	banks	are	more	 likely	 to	 smooth	earnings	 rather	 than	 to	 take	a	“big	bath”	(i.e.	*+,!$A = C;//1ℎ*+$A).	 	Table	9	Panel	B	shows	that	after	removing	the	 observations	 with	 extremely	 low	*+,!$A ,	 there	 are	 significant	 pre-period	difference	 and	 difference-in-differences	 between	 treatment	 and	 control	 banks	 on	both	 the	 income-increasing	 and	 income-decreasing	DRGL,	which	 support	 both	H1	and	 H2.	 	 These	 results	 are	 consistent	 with	 what	 I	 find	 in	 Table	 6,	 in	 that	 the	reporting	position	 of	 CI/OCI	mainly	 affects	 the	 selective	 sales	 of	AFS	 securities	 to	smooth	earnings.		
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7.	Sensitivity	Tests	7.1	Sensitivity	Tests	Using	Alternative	Model	Specifications	7.1.1	Sensitivity	Tests	Using	Alternative	Earnings	and	Regulatory	Capital	Targets	In	 the	 regression	 analyses	 of	 Equation	 (2),	 I	 assume	 the	 earnings	 and	regulatory	capital	targets	are	banks’	average	net	income	and	regulatory	capital	ratio.		Following	 Barth	 et	 al.	 (2015),	 I	 also	 consider	 industry	 median	 net	 income	 and	regulatory	 capital	 ratio	 in	 the	 prior	 quarter	 as	 the	 alternative	 earnings	 and	regulatory	 capital	 targets.	 	 Thus,	 in	 this	 section,	 I	 examine	 whether	 banks	 use	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities	to	smooth	earnings	towards	the	industry	median	in	the	prior	quarter	and	how	the	reporting	position	of	CI/OCI	affects	this	behavior.			Accordingly,	 I	 replace	*+,!$,&	in	 Equation	 (1)	 with	 the	 difference	 between	bank-quarterly	*+,!$,& 	and	 industry	 median	*+,!& 	in	 the	 prior	 quarter	 (i.e.	*+,!$,& − ;*+,!&TB).	 	 I	 also	 replace	!8F.5V$,&	with	 the	 difference	 between	bank-quarterly	!8F.5V$,& 	and	 industry	 median	!8F.5V& 	in	 the	 prior	 quarter	 (i.e.	!8F.5V$,& − ;!8F.5V&TB).	 	 The	 industry	 median	*+,!&	and	 the	 industry	 median	!8F.5V&	are	 calculated	using	 all	 the	 bank	holding	 companies	 that	 registered	with	SEC.		I	still	assume	that	banks	are	more	likely	to	take	a	big	bath	if	*+,!$,&<0	and	do	not	have	sufficient	accumulated	unrealized	gains	and	losses	at	the	beginning	of	the	quarter	 to	 offset	 the	 negative	*+,!$,& .	 	 Thus,	 I	 re-estimate	 Equation	 (2)	 with	 the	following	 replacements:	 	C;//1ℎ*+$A 	is	 replaced	 by	57C;//1ℎ*+$A ,	 which	 equals	*+,!$A − ;*+,!ATB 	if	*+,!$A >0	 or	*+,!$A +	RS"#ATB 	>0	 and	 0	 otherwise;	
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,6F751ℎ*+$A 	is	 replaced	 by		57,6F751ℎ*+$A ,	 which	 equals	*+,!$A − ;*+,!ATB	if	*+,!$A<0	 and	*+,!$A +	RS"#ATB	<0,	 and	 0	 otherwise;	!8F.5V$,A 	is	 replaced	 by	57!8F.5V$,A ,	 which	 equals	!8F.5V$A − ;!8F.5VATB.	 	 The	 regression	 results	 are	presented	in	Table	10	Panel	A.		The	results	in	Table	10	Panel	A	are	very	similar	to	those	displayed	in	Table	6.		The	significant	and	negative	coefficients	on	H2851×57C;//1ℎ*+$A 	in	 the	tests	with	both	 the	 whole	 sample	 and	 the	 matched	 sample	 (i.e.	 −0.050	 and	 −0.075	respectively)	suggest	 that	before	the	enactment	of	ASU	2011-05,	banks	presenting	CI/OCI	 in	 the	 equity	 statements	 conduct	 more	 earnings	 smoothing	 towards	 the	industry	 median	 earnings	 through	 selective	 sales	 of	 AFS	 securities	 than	 banks	presenting	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	 performance	 statements.	 	 The	 significant	 and	 negative	coefficients	 on	H2851×LMCH×57C;//1ℎ*+$A 	in	 the	 tests	 with	 both	 the	 whole	sample	 and	 the	matched	 sample	 (i.e.,	 0.036	 and	 0.038	 respectively)	 suggest	 that,	compared	 to	 the	banks	 that	 always	use	performance	 statements	 to	 report	CI/OCI,	banks	that	were	mandated	to	switch	the	reporting	position	of	CI/OCI	experienced	a	more	pronounced	decrease	in	earnings	smoothing	from	the	pre-	to	the	post-update	period.	 <Table	10,	Panel	A>		
		 40	
7.1.2	Sensitivity	Tests	Using	Additional	Control	Variables	Firms	may	sell	securities	to	raise	cash	flow.		But	cash	flow	is	not	included	in	the	 main	 regression	 analyses	 of	 Equation	 (2)	 since	 it	 is	 already	 included	 in	 the	regulatory	capital	as	a	part	of	 liquidity	assets.	 	As	a	sensitivity	test,	 I	also	estimate	Equation	(2)	by	further	controlling	for	the	incentive	to	raise	cash.		Table	10	Panel	B	presents	 the	 regression	 results	 of	 Equation	 (2)	with	 variable	.59ℎ$A 	included	 as	 a	control	 variable.	 	 The	 variable	.59ℎ$A 	is	 measured	 as	 cash	 and	 cash	 equivalents	before	sales	of	investment	securities	scaled	by	total	assets.		The	results	suggest	that	including	 additional	 control	 variable	.59ℎ$A 	does	 not	 significantly	 affect	 the	inference	of	the	main	results	in	Table	6.	<Table	10,	Panel	B>		7.1.3	Sensitivity	Tests	Using	Alternative	Dependent	Variable	Furthermore,	 I	 examine	whether	 the	 regression	 results	 of	Equation	 (2)	 are	robust	 with	 the	 dependent	 variable	 (i.e.,	!"#$A)	 replaced	 by	 the	 discretionary	realized	 gains	 and	 losses	 on	 AFS	 securities	 (i.e.,	W!"#$A).	 	 The	 calculation	 of	W!"#$A	is	 explained	 in	 Section	 6.3.	 	 The	 results	 of	 this	 sensitivity	 test	 using	alternative	 dependent	 variable	 are	 presented	 in	 Table	 10	 Panel	 C.	 	 Replacing	 the	dependent	variable	!"#$A 	by	W!"#$A 	does	not	change	 the	sign	and	 the	significance	level	 of	 the	 coefficient	on	H2851×C;//1ℎ*+$A,	which	 is	 −0.047	 (t-stat	=	−2.65)	 for	the	whole	sample	estimation	and	−0.091	(t-stat	=	−3.30)	for	the	matched	subsample.		
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Similarly,	 replacing	 the	 dependent	 variable	!"#$A 	by	W!"#$A 	also	 does	 not	 change	the	sign	and	the	significance	level	on	H2851×LMCH×C;//1ℎ*+$A,	which	is	0.029	(t-stat	 =	 1.90)	 for	 the	 whole	 sample	 estimation	 and	 0.044	 (t-stat	 =	 1.68)	 for	 the	matched	subsample.	However,	different	from	the	results	 in	Table	6,	 the	coefficients	on	RS"#$ATB	and	 !8F.5V$A 	in	 Table	 10	 Panel	 C	 are	 both	 insignificant,	 suggesting	 the	discretionary	 part	 of	 the	 realized	 gains	 and	 losses	 on	 AFS	 securities	 are	 not	associated	 with	RS"#$ATB 	and	!8F.5V$A .	 	 Note	 that,	 replacing	 the	 dependent	variable	!"#$A 	by	W!"#$A 	also	 significantly	 reduces	 the	 explanatory	 power	 (i.e.,	 R-squared)	of	the	estimation	regression.	<Table	10,	Panel	C>		7.1.4	Sensitivity	Tests	Using	Alternative	Definition	of	Big	Bath	Earnings	Management	In	 the	 primary	 analyses,	 I	assume	 that	 banks	 are	more	 likely	 to	 take	 a	 big	bath	if	*+,!$,&<0	and	do	not	have	sufficient	accumulated	unrealized	gains	and	losses	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	quarter	 to	offset	 the	negative	*+,!$,& ,	while	 in	Barth	et	 al.	(2015)	the	authors	simply	expect	banks	with	negative	*+,!$,&	to	take	a	big	bath.		In	order	to	examine	whether	the	results	of	my	primary	analyses	are	robust	with	Barth	et	 al.	 (2015)’s	 definition	 of	 “Big	 Bath	 Earnings”,	 I	 re-estimate	 the	 following	regression	with	both	the	whole	sample	and	the	matched	subsample:	
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!"#$A = 	(BL/96*+$A + (E*8F*+$A	+	(GH2851×L/96*+$A + (JH2851	×*8F*+$A	+	(KLMCH×L/96*+$A + (NLMCH×*8F*+$A	+	(OH2851×LMCH×L/96*+$A + (PH2851×LMCH×*8F*+$A	+	(QRS"#$,ATB + (BU!8F.5V$A + (BBR:C$A + (BEH>WA + (BG4+XA	+	(BJLMCH + (BKH2851×LMCH + (BN+0=L/96$A 	+	(BOH2851×+0=L/96$A + (BPLMCH×+0=L/96$A 	+	(BQH2851×LMCH×+0=L/96$A + :6<8=>??8@19	 (5)	where	L/96*+$A 	equals	*+,!$A 	if	*+,!$A >0	 and	 0	 otherwise.	 	*8F*+$A 	equals	*+,!$A 	if	*+,!$A <0	 and	 0	 otherwise.	+0=L/96$A	equals	 1	 if	*+,!$A >0	 and	 0	otherwise.	 	 All	 the	 other	 variables	 are	 defined	 the	 same	 as	 those	 in	 Equation	 (2).		The	 results	 are	presented	 in	Table	10	Panel	D,	which	 are	 very	 similar	 to	 those	 in	Table	6.			 <Table	10,	Panel	D>		7.2	Sensitivity	Tests	Using	Alternative	Subsamples	First,	I	examine	whether	the	primary	results	stand	with	one-single-statement	users	excluded.		In	the	primary	analyses,	I	treat	one-single-statement	reporting	(i.e.	presenting	CI	in	a	single	statement	with	NI)	and	two-separate-statements	reporting	(i.e.	presenting	CI	 in	a	 separate	 statement	of	 comprehensive	 income	 following	 the	income	 statement)	 both	 as	 performance	 statement	 reporting.	 	 Since	 only	 a	 few	
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banks	 used	 one-single	 statement	 during	 the	 test	 period	 (see	 Footnote	 12),	 I	 am	unable	to	compare	the	difference	between	the	one-single-statement	users	and	two-separate-statements	users	in	either	the	pre-update	period	or	the	post-update	period.		However,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 examine	 whether	 the	 difference	 between	 treatment	banks	and	control	banks	are	driven	by	the	banks	that	voluntarily	used	one-single-statement	 reporting	method.	 	 Thus,	 I	 re-estimate	 the	 regressions	 in	 Table	 6	with	both	the	whole	sample	and	the	matched	subsample	respectively,	but	excluding	the	one-single-statement	users.	In	the	whole	sample,	8	control	banks	used	one-single-statement	reporting	in	the	pre-update	period,	and	9	treatment	banks	used	one-single-statement	reporting	in	the	post-update	period.		Excluding	these	banks,	I	have	3,728	bank-quarters	from	24	control	banks	and	166	treatment	banks.		I	first	re-estimate	Equation	(2)	with	this	subsample	and	present	the	results	in	the	Table	11	Panel	A.			<Table	11,	Panel	A>	The	 results	 in	 Table	 11	 Panel	 A	 have	 the	 same	 inference	 with	 those	 in	 Table	 6,	suggesting	 that	 the	 difference	 between	 treatment	 and	 control	 banks	 and	 the	difference-in-differences	 effects	 are	 not	 mainly	 driven	 by	 the	 difference	 between	one-single-statement	users	and	the	other	banks.		The	regression	results	are	also	similar	with	a	matched	subsample	excluding	one-single-statement	 users.	 	 To	 generate	 this	 matched	 subsample,	 I	 match	 each	control	 bank	 (No.=24)	 to	 a	 treatment	bank	with	 the	 closest	 average	quarterly	LD,	
MTB,	 SIZE	 and	 AFS	 in	 the	 pre-update	 period	 (2010–2011)	 using	 a	 Mahalanobis	
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matching	method.		After	matching,	I	have	24	treatment	banks	and	24	control	banks.		The	regression	results	are	presented	in	Table	11	Panel	B.		<	Table	11,	Panel	B>	Second,	 in	 the	main	 tests,	 I	 exclude	 the	 treatment	 banks	 that	 switched	 the	reporting	position	of	CI/OCI	in	either	2011	or	2013	(No.=31	and	5	respectively).		In	the	former	case,	the	firms	voluntarily	adopt	ASU	2011-05	immediately	after	it	was	issued	but	before	 the	mandatory	adoption	year.	 	 In	 the	 latter	 case,	 the	 firms	with	fiscal	year	end	before	December	and	after	May	can	delay	the	adoption	of	ASU	2011-05	 until	 their	 fiscal	 year	 2013.	 	 In	 the	 sensitivity	 tests,	 I	 estimate	 the	 following	regression	with	 the	 treatment	 banks	 that	 switched	 the	 reporting	position	 of	 CI	 in	2011,	2012	or	2013	all	together:	!"#$A = 	(BC;//1ℎ*+$A + (E,6F751ℎ*+$A	+	(GSV=518×C;//1ℎ*+$A + (JSV=518×,6F751ℎ*+$A	+	(KRS"#$,ATB + (N!8F.5V$A + (OR:C$A + (PH>WA + (Q4+XA	+	(BUSV=518 + (BB+0=C;//1ℎ$A + (BESV=518×+0=C;//1ℎ$A 	+:6<8=>??8@19	 (6)	The	 results	 are	 presented	 in	 Table	 11	 Panel	 C.	 	 Update	 equals	 1	 in	 the	quarters	 after	 treatment	 banks	 adopted	 ASU	 2011-05.	 	 The	 coefficient	 on	SV=518×C;//1ℎ*+$A 	is	 positive	 and	 significant	 (0.026,	 t-stat	 =	 2.68),	 which	suggests	that,	in	general,		all	the	treatment	banks	including	those	switched	reporting	position	 of	 CI/OCI	 in	 2011	 or	 2013,	 exhibit	 a	 significant	 decrease	 in	 earnings	smoothing	through	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities	after	applying	ASU	2011-05.	
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<Table	11,	Panel	C>	Third,	I	examine	whether	very	large	treatment	banks	also	reduced	earnings	management	in	response	to	ASU	2011-05.		The	“too	big	to	fail”	theory	suggests	that	the	biggest	companies,	especially	banks,	are	so	vital	 to	the	economy	and	therefore	will	be	supported	by	the	government	when	facing	failure.		According	to	this	theory,	the	 largest	 banks	 may	 have	 different	 incentives	 with	 those	 smaller	 banks	 in	accounting	 choices.	 	 For	 example,	 the	 largest	 banks	 may	 not	 have	 the	 similar	incentive	 to	 smooth	 earnings	 or	 to	 change	 their	 earnings	 management	 behavior	based	on	the	scrutiny	from	investors	with	those	of	the	smaller	banks.		I	estimate	the	following	equation	with	a	subsample	of	38	treatment	banks	that	have	average	total	assets	in	the	test	period	above	10	billion:		!"#$A = 	(BC;//1ℎ*+$A + (E,6F751ℎ*+$A	+	(GLMCH×C;//1ℎ*+$A + (JLMCH×,6F751ℎ*+$A	+	(KRS"#$,ATB + (N!8F.5V$A + (OR:C$A + (PH>WA + (Q4+XA	+	(BULMCH + (BB+0=C;//1ℎ$A + (BELMCH×+0=C;//1ℎ$A 	+:6<8=>??8@19	 (7)	The	results	are	presented	in	Table	11	Panel	D,	suggesting	that	large	treatment	banks	also	engage	in	earnings	smoothing	using	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities	(captured	by	 significantly	negative	 coefficient	on	C;//1ℎ*+$A)	 and	significantly	 reduce	 these	behaviors	 after	 they	 are	 forced	 to	 present	 CI	 in	 the	 performance	 statements	(captured	by	significantly	positive	coefficient	on	LMCH×C;//1ℎ*+$A).	
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<Table	11,	Panel	D>		7.3	Sensitivity	Tests	Using	Alternative	Test	Period	For	the	primary	tests	in	Table	6,	I	conduct	a	difference-in-differences	design	with	a	 test	period	 from	2010	 to	2014.	 	The	results	 in	Table	6	suggests	 that	banks	presenting	CI	 in	 the	equity	 statement	exhibit	more	earnings	management	 through	selective	 sales	 of	 AFS	 securities	 than	 banks	 presenting	 CI	 in	 the	 performance	statements.	 	To	 further	 examine	whether	 the	difference	 in	 earnings	managements	between	 the	 equity	 statement	 users	 and	 the	 performance	 statement	 users	 also	exists	in	the	periods	prior	to	2010,	I	estimate	the	following	regression	with	a	sample	of	banks	with	reporting	position	data	and	necessary	variables	from	1999–2009:	!"#$A = 	(BC;//1ℎ*+$A + (E,6F751ℎ*+$A	+	(GL82?×C;//1ℎ*+$A + (JL82?×,6F751ℎ*+$A +	(KRS"#$,ATB + (N!8F.5V$A + (OR:C$A + (PH>WA + (Q4+XA	+	(BUL82? + (BB+0=C;//1ℎ$A + (BEL82?×+0=C;//1ℎ$A 	+:6<8=>??8@19	 (8)	L82?	equals	1	for	the	bank-quarters	presenting	CI	in	the	performance	statements,	and	0	otherwise.		All	the	other	variables	are	defined	the	same	way	as	those	in	Equation	(2).		I	first	estimate	Equation	(8)	with	a	sample	of	data	from	1999	to	2009,	which	contains	15,207	firm-quarters	and	3,306	of	them	have	L82?=1.		The	results	are	presented	in	Table	12	Column	1.		I	then	examine	whether	the	estimations	are	
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affected	by	the	financial	crisis	period	2007–2009.		Thus,	I	split	the	test	period	1999–2009	into	two	separate	sub-periods:	1999–2006	and	2007–2009.		For	the	test	with	period	1999–2006,	I	have	11,390	bank-quarters,	in	which	2,528	of	them	have	L82?=1	(see	Table	12	Column	2).		For	the	test	with	period	2007–2009,	I	have	3,817	bank-quarters,	in	which	778	of	them	have	L82?=1	(see	Table	12	Column	3).			<Table	12>	Coefficients	 on	C;//1ℎ*+$A 	(,6F751ℎ*+$A)	 capture	 earnings	 smoothing	 (big	bath)	 behaviors	 of	 banks	 presenting	 CI	 in	 the	 equity	 statements;	 	 the	 sum	 of	 the	coefficients	 on	 C;//1ℎ*+$A 	and	 L82?×C;//1ℎ*+$A 	( ,6F751ℎ*+$A 	and +L82?×,6F751ℎ*+$A)	captures	earnings	smoothing	(big	bath)	behaviors	of	banks	presenting	CI	 in	 the	 performance	 statements;	 and	 coefficients	 on	 L82?×C;//1ℎ*+$A 	(L82?×,6F751ℎ*+$A)	 capture	 the	 difference	 in	 earnings	 smoothing	 (big	 bath)	behaviors	between	banks	presenting	CI	 in	 the	performance	 statements	 and	banks	presenting	CI	in	the	equity	statements.		The	results	in	Table	12	demonstrate	that,	in	general,	 except	 during	 the	 financial	 crisis	 period	 (Table	 12	 Column	 3),	 the	 banks	presenting	 CI	 in	 the	 equity	 statements	 exhibit	 significant	 earnings	 smoothing	 and	big	bath	behaviors	through	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities	(captured	by	significant	coefficients	 on	C;//1ℎ*+$A 	and	,6F751ℎ*+$A).	 	 However,	 I	 fail	 to	 find	 significant	earnings	 smoothing	 or	 big	 bath	 behaviors	 with	 the	 banks	 presenting	 CI	 in	 the	performance	 statements	 (captured	 by	 coefficients	 on	 C;//1ℎ*+$A + L82?×C;//1ℎ*+$A 	and	 ,6F751ℎ*+$A + L82?×,6F751ℎ*+$A ).	 	 The	 coefficients	 on	
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L82?×C;//1ℎ*+$A 	and	L82?×,6F751ℎ*+$A 	have	 expected	 signs,	 suggesting	 that	banks	 presenting	 CI	 in	 the	 performance	 statements	 exhibit	 less	 earnings	management	than	banks	presenting	CI	in	the	equity	statements.		The	coefficient	on	L82?×,6F751ℎ*+$A 	is	generally	significant,	but	the	coefficient	on	L82?×C;//1ℎ*+$A 	is	only	significant	for	the	period	excluding	2007–2009.	 	 In	summary,	the	results	 in	Table	 12	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 inference	 that	 banks	 presenting	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	equity	statements	engage	in	more	management	of	realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities	compared	to	banks	presenting	CI/OCI	in	the	performance	statements.			7.4	Other	Sensitivity	Tests	In	 addition,	 I	 also	 examine	whether	 the	main	 results	 stand	with	 firm	 fixed	effects	removed.		The	estimation	results	of	Equation	(2)	are	similar	when	firm	fixed	effects	are	replaced	by	an	 intercept	 (untabulated).	 	Finally,	 I	examine	whether	 the	main	 results	 vary	 with	 different	 cluster	 methods,	 and	 find	 that	 using	 robust	standard	errors	or	standard	errors	that	are	clustered	by	bank	does	not	significantly	change	the	inference.		
8.		CONCLUSION	U.S.	 standard	 setters	 recently	 issued	 amendment	 ASU	 2011-05,	 which	requires	 all	 firms	 to	 report	 comprehensive	 income	 (CI)	 and	 other	 comprehensive	income	 (OCI)	 in	 the	 performance	 statements	 (either	 directly	 in	 the	 income	statement,	or	in	a	separate	statement	of	comprehensive	income),	and	eliminates	the	
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previously-allowed	option	of	providing	CI/OCI	in	a	non-performance	statement	(the	statement	 of	 shareholders’	 equity).	 	 Accordingly,	 this	 paper	 assesses	whether	 the	mandated	 change	 to	 include	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	 performance	 statements	 achieves	 the	standard	setter	goal	of	increased	transparency,	by	examining	whether	this	mandate	leads	to	reduced	earnings	management	behavior.			Prior	 experimental	 and	 empirical	 papers	 suggest	 that	 managers	 believe	presenting	CI/OCI	in	the	equity	statements	inhibits	financial	statement	users’	ability	to	 detect	 earnings	management	 via	 selective	 sales	 of	 AFS	 securities.	 	 Using	 hand-collected	 reporting	 position	 data	 of	 CI/OCI	 of	 public	 bank-holding	 companies,	 I	examine	the	effect	of	ASU	2011-05,	which	requires	performance	reporting	of	CI/OCI	in	 2012,	 on	 earnings	 management	 through	 selectively	 selling	 AFS	 securities.		Employing	 a	 difference-in-differences	 research	 design,	 I	 document	 three	 primary	findings.	 	 First,	 before	 the	enactment	of	ASU	2011-05,	banks	presenting	CI/OCI	 in	the	 equity	 statements	 exhibit	 greater	 earnings	 smoothing	 using	 selective	 sales	 of	AFS	 securities	 than	 banks	 that	 always	 present	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	 performance	statements.	 	Second,	banks	mandated	to	switch	the	reporting	position	of	CI/OCI	to	the	performance	statements	after	2011	also	exhibit	a	more	pronounced	decrease	in	earnings	 smoothing	 through	 selective	 sales	 of	 AFS	 securities	 from	 the	 pre-	 to	 the	post-update	period.		Finally,	despite	this	latter	decline,	the	reporting	of	CI/OCI	in	the	performance	 statements	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 fully	 eliminate	 banks’	 earnings	smoothing	 behaviors	 using	 selective	 sales	 of	 AFS	 securities.	 	 These	 findings	 are	consistent	across	a	number	of	alternative	specifications.		Overall,	the	results	suggest	
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that	 presenting	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	 performance	 statements	 helps	 reduce	 earnings	management	using	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities.	This	 paper	 makes	 three	 contributions.	 	 First,	 it	 has	 implications	 for	 the	reporting	 policy	 of	 CI	 and	 OCI.	 	 The	 evidence	 reveals	 that	 ASU	 2011-05	 helps	increase	the	transparency	of	CI/OCI	as	the	FASB	expected,	suggesting	presentation	can	mitigate	opportunistic	managerial	reporting	behavior.	 	Second,	 this	 is	 the	 first	study	 to	 exploit	 a	 natural	 experiment	 to	 examine	 how	 the	 presentation	 of	recognized	 items	 in	 different	 financial	 statements	 affects	 earning	 management	behaviors.		As	such,	it	complements	prior	research,	which	focuses	on	experimental	settings	 (e.g.,	 Hirst	 and	 Hopkins	 1998).	 	 Further,	 the	 insights	 here	 likely	 have	implications	for	the	broader	financial	reporting	issue	of	performance	reporting,	and	how	 this	 relates	 to	 various	management	 reporting	 behaviors.	 	 Finally,	 this	 paper	contributes	 to	 studies	 investigating	 earnings	 management	 behaviors	 in	 banks.		Specifically,	 this	paper	extends	these	studies	by	demonstrating	that	selective	sales	of	AFS	securities	are	affected	by	the	performance	reporting	of	CI/OCI.22			 	
																																																								22		One	limitation	of	this	paper	is	that	I	am	unable	to	examine	the	changes	in	earnings	management	to	meet	or	beat	a	specific	earnings	target.		This	is	because	I	cannot	identify	a	large	enough	subsample	of	firms	with	earnings	before	realized	gains	and	losses	slightly	lower	than	the	potential	earnings	targets	such	as	analysts’	forecasts	or	prior	quarters’	earnings.			
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APPENDICES	
Appendix	1.	Examples	of	the	Reporting	of	Comprehensive	Income		
Method	1:	Report	Comprehensive	Income	in	the	Income	Statement	with	Net	Income	(1	page,	allowed	under	ASU	2011-05)		Consolidated	Statements	of	Income	and	Comprehensive	Income	(in	Thousands)	
Synovus	Financial	Corp,	Year	end	December	31,	2012	
Interest	Income	 				Loan,	including	Fees	 $	924,639				Available-for-sale	securities	 68,440				Trading	securities	 963				Mortgage	loans	 6,201				Federal	Reserve	Bank	balances	 3,451				Other	 446				Total	Interest	Income	 1,004,140	
Total	interest	expense	 150,023	
Net	interest	income	 854,117	
Provision	for	loan	losses	 320,369	
Net	interest	income	after	provision	for	loan	losses	 533,748	
Non-interest	Income:	 				Service	charges	on	deposit	account	 78,203				Asset	management	fees	 42,503				Brokerage	revenue	 26,913				Mortgage	banking	income	 32,272				Bankcard	fees	 34,075				Realized	gains	(losses)	on	AFS	securities,	net	 39,142				Increase	(decrease)	in	fair	value	of	PE	investments,	net	 8,233				Other	non-interest	income	 52,625				Total	non-interest	income	 313,966	
Non-interest	expense	 816,237	
Total	Income	(loss)	before	tax	 (31,477)	
Tax	expense	(benefit)	 (798,732)	
Net	Income	 830,209	
Net	unrealized	gains/losses	on	Cash	flow	hedges,	net	of	tax		 (849)	
Net	unrealized	gains	/losses	on	Available-for-sale	securities,	
net	of	tax	
			Net	unrealized	gains	(losses)	during	the	period,	before	tax	 12,296			Reclassification	adjustment	for	(gains)	losses	realized	in	net								income,	before	tax	 (39,142)				Tax	expense	(benefit)	on	net	realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS		 10,340	
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						securities	Net	realized	gains	(losses)	 (16,506)	
Adjustment	of	the	post-retirement	unfunded	health	benefit,	
net	of	tax	
	363	
Other	comprehensive	income	(losses),	net	of	tax	 (16,992)	
Comprehensive	Income	(loss),	net	of	tax	 813,217		 			 	
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Method	2:	Report	Comprehensive	Income	in	the	Statement	of	Comprehensive	Income	Following	the	Income	Statement	(2	pages,	allowed	under	ASU	2011-05)		Consolidated	Statements	of	Income	(in	Thousands)	
Synovus	Financial	Corp,	Year	end	December	31,	2012	
Interest	Income	 				Loan,	including	Fees	 $	924,639				Available-for-sale	securities	 68,440				Trading	securities	 963				Mortgage	loans	 6,201				Federal	Reserve	Bank	balances	 3,451				Other	 446				Total	Interest	Income	 1,004,140	
Total	interest	expense	 150,023	
Net	interest	income	 854,117	
Provision	for	loan	losses	 320,369	
Net	interest	income	after	provision	for	loan	losses	 533,748	
Non-interest	Income:	 				Service	charges	on	deposit	account	 78,203				Asset	management	fees	 42,503				Brokerage	revenue	 26,913				Mortgage	banking	income	 32,272				Bankcard	fees	 34,075				Realized	gains	(losses)	on	available-for-sale	securities,	net	 39,142				Increase	(decrease)	in	fair	value	of	PE	investments,	net	 8,233				Other	non-interest	income	 52,625				Total	non-interest	income	 313,966	
Non-interest	expense	 816,237	
Total	Income	(loss)	before	tax	 (31,477)	
Tax	expense	(benefit)	 (798,732)	
Net	Income	 830,209			 	
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Method	2:	Report	Comprehensive	Income	in	the	Statement	of	Comprehensive	Income	Following	the	Income	Statement	(2	pages,	allowed	under	ASU	2011-05)	(continued)	 	Consolidated	Statements	of	Comprehensive	Income	(in	Thousands)	
Synovus	Financial	Corp,	Year	end	December	31,	2012	
Net	Income	 830,209	
Net	unrealized	gains	or	losses	on	Cash	flow	hedges,	net	of	tax		 (849)	
Net	unrealized	gains	/losses	on	Available-for-sale	securities,	
net	of	tax:	
			Net	unrealized	gains	(losses),	before	tax	 12,296			Reclassification	adjustment	for	(gains)	losses	realized	in	net	income,	before	tax	 	(39,142)				Tax	expense	(benefit)	on	net	realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities	 	10,340	
Net	realized	gains	(losses)	 (16,506)	
Adjustment	of	post-retirement	unfunded	health	benefit	 363	
Other	comprehensive	income,	net	of	tax	 (16,992)	
Comprehensive	Income	(loss),	net	of	tax	 813,217					
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Method	3:	Reporting	Comprehensive	Income	in	the	Equity	Statements	(not	allowed	under	ASU	2011-05)	Consolidated	Statements	of	Changes	in	Equity	and	Comprehensive	Income	(in	Thousands)	
Synovus	Financial	Corp,	Year	end	December	31,	2012		 Total	 Preferred	Stock	 Common	Stock	 Additional	Paid-in	Cap.	 Treasury	Stock	 Accumulated	OCI	
Balance	at	Dec	31,	2011	 2,827,452	 947,017	 		790,989	 2,241,171	 (114,176)	 21,093	
Net	income	 830,209	 	 	 	 	 	Other	comprehensive	income	(loss),	net	of	tax	 	 	 	 	 	 				Net	unrealized	gains	(losses)	on	cash	flow	hedges	 	(849)	 	 	 	 	 	(849)				Changes	in	net	unrealized	gains	and	losses	on	available-for-sale	securities,	net	of	reclassification	adjustment	 																	(16,506)	 	 	 	 	 		 (16,506)				Adjustment	of	post-retirement	unfunded	health	benefit	 	363	 	 	 	 	 	363				Other	comprehensive	income	(loss)	 (16,992)	 	 	 	 	 (16,992)	
Comprehensive	income	(loss)	 813,217	 	 	 	 	 	Cash	dividends	declared	on	common	stock	 		(31,462)	 	 	 	 	 	Cash	dividends	paid	on	preferred	stock	 	(48,394)	 	 	 (48,394)	 	 	Accretion	of	discount	on	preferred	stock	 		 						10,310	 	 (10,310)	 	 	Restricted	share	unit	activity	 	 	 							1,284	 (1,211)	 	 	Share-based	compensation	expense	 	9,333	 	 	 9,333	 	 	Share-based	compensation	tax	deficiency	 	(715)	 	 	 	(715)	 	 	Balance	at	Dec	31,	2012	 			3,569,431	 		957,327	 		792,273	 2,189,874	 (114,176)	 4101	
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Appendix	2.	Variable	Definitions	
Variables	Used	in	Matching	Samples	!"#$%	 =	total	AFS	securities	(fair	value)	scaled	by	total	assets.	&'$%	 =	long-term	debt	scaled	by	total	assets.	()*$%	 =	market	to	book	value	ratio.	#+,-$%	 =	natural	logarithm	of	total	assets.		
Variables	Used	in	The	Primary	Analyses	in	Table	6	and	7	!./&$%01	 =	accumulated	unrealized	gains	or	losses	on	AFS	securities	at	the	beginning	of	the	quarter	scaled	by	lagged	total	assets.	*$234567+$%	 =	89:;<= 	if	89:;<=<0	and	89:;<=+	AUGLq-1<0,	and	0	otherwise.	+>?#@AA56	 =1	if	89:;<=>0	or	89:;<=+	AUGLq-1>0,	and	0	otherwise.	7+*B$%	 =	net	income	before	realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities,	taxes	and	extraordinary	items	scaled	by	the	beginning	of	quarter	total	assets.	CD#)	 =	1	for	the	fiscal	year	from	2012,	and	0	otherwise.	BE2F4G$%	 =	bank’s	end	of	quarter	regulatory	capital	ratio,	which	is	calculated	as	allowable	Tier	1	plus	Tier	2	regulatory	capital	before	;HI<= 	and	after	taxes	scaled	by	risk-weighted	assets.	B/&$%	 =	realized	gains	or	losses	on	AFS	securities	scaled	by	the	beginning	of	quarter	total	assets.	#@AA567+$%	 =	89:;<= 	if	89:;<=>0	or	89:;<=+	AUGLq-1>0,	and	0	otherwise.	)-'%	 =	quarterly	Ted	spread.		Ted	spread	is	the	difference	between	the	interest	rates	on	interbank	loans	and	on	short-term	U.S.	government	debt	("T-bills").	)JE45	 =	1	if	the	bank	reports	OCI	in	the	equity	statements	before	adopting	ASU	2011-05	(in	all	the	quarters	from	2010	to	2011),	and	0	otherwise.	K+L%	 =	quarterly	implied	volatility	of	options	on	the	S&P500	Index.		
Variables	Used	in	The	Cross-sectional	Analyses	in	Table	8	!>4MNO5$%	 =1	if	the	bank’s	quarterly	average	analysts	following	is	above	the	75	percentile	of	the	total	treatment	banks	observations,	and	0	otherwise.		I	generate	PQRSTUV<= 	using	the	primary	treatment	bank	sample,	which	contains	3,444	observation	from	175	treatment	banks.		*$2W$%	 =1	if	the	bank	is	audited	by	Big	4	audit	firms,	and	0	otherwise.	+>O5AX>$%	 =1	if	the	bank’s	quarterly	institutional	ownership	percentage	is	larger	than	the	75	percentile	of	the	total	treatment	banks	observations,	and	0	otherwise.		I	generate	9QUVYZQ<= 	using	the	
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primary	treatment	bank	sample,	which	contains	3,444	observation	from	175	treatment	banks.	The	institutional	ownership	percentage	is	calculated	as	quarterly	average	institutional	ownership	scaled	by	total	shares	outstanding.		
Variables	Used	in	The	Supplementary	Analyses	in	Table	9	!3O_'B/&$%	 =	the	absolute	value	of	discretionary	realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities.	'B/&$%	 =	discretionary	realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities,	which	is	calculated	as	the	residual	of	the	estimation	of	“normal”	realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities	using	Equation	(3).	&A2!>4M$%	 =	natural	logarithm	of	one	plus	the	number	of	quarterly	average	analysts	following.	For	the	bank-quarters	without	IBES	data,	I	assume	a	zero	analysts	following.	&A2+>O5$%	 =	natural	logarithm	of	one	plus	the	number	of	quarterly	average	institutional	ownership	presented	as	a	percentage	of	total	shares	outstanding.	For	the	bank-quarters	without	IBES	data,	I	assume	a	zero	institutional	ownership.		
Variables	Used	in	The	Sensitivity	Tests	in	Table	10-12	43*$234567+$%	 =	89:;<= − ]89:;=0^	if	89:;<=<0	and	89:;<=+	AUGLq-1<0,	and	0	otherwise,	]89:;=0^	is	the	prior	quarter	median	89:;<= 	for	all	the	bank	holding	companies	that	registered	with	SEC.	43#@AA567+$%	 =	89:;<= − ]89:;=0^	if	89:;<=>0	or	89:;<=+	AUGLq-1>0,	and	0	otherwise,	]89:;=0^	is	the	prior	quarter	median	89:;<= 	for	all	the	bank	holding	companies	that	registered	with	SEC.	43BE2F4G$%	 =	;_`aRb<= − ];_`aRb=0^,	];_`aRb=0^	is	the	prior	quarter	median	;_`aRb<= 	for	all	the	bank	holding	companies	that	registered	with	SEC.	F4O6$%	 =	cash	and	cash	equivalents	before	sales	of	investment	securities	scaled	by	total	assets.	+>?CAO$$%	 =	1	if	89:;<=>0	and	0	otherwise.	7E27+$%	 =	89:;<= 	if	89:;<=<0	and	0	otherwise.	.G?45E	 =	1in	the	quarters	after	treatment	banks	switched	the	reporting	position	of	CI	from	equity	statements	to	performance	statements,	and	0	otherwise.	CEJd	 =	1	for	bank-quarters	with	CI	presented	in	the	performance	statements,	and	0	otherwise.	CAO$7+$%	 =	89:;<= 	if	89:;<=>0	and	0	otherwise.	
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Figure	1:		Earnings	Smoothing	for	Both	Treatment	Banks	and	Control	Banks	in	
The	Pre-period	and	The	Post-period	
	
	This	figure	displays	the	Earnings	Smoothing	behaviors	for	both	Treatment	and	Control	Banks	in	the	pre-	and	post-update	periods.	
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Table	1.	Reporting	Position	Distribution	of	Comprehensive	Income	for	Bank	
Holding	Companies		
Year	
(1)	Equity	Statements	Users	
(2)	Performance	Statements	Users	
(3)	No.	of	Switches	to	Equity	Statements	
(4)	No.	of	Switches	to	Performance	Statements	
(5)			Total	1998	 256	 92	 0	 0	 348	1999	 281	 85	 9	 0	 366	2000	 288	 86	 2	 2	 374	2001	 296	 77	 1	 0	 373	2002	 305	 82	 2	 4	 387	2003	 308	 85	 1	 3	 393	2004	 303	 84	 1	 2	 387	2005	 321	 86	 3	 6	 407	2006	 314	 90	 2	 3	 404	2007	 306	 76	 5	 4	 382	2008	 305	 68	 1	 0	 373	2009	 297	 63	 3	 5	 360	2010	 285	 54	 3	 1	 339	2011	 231	 99	 1	 39	 330	2012	 12	 398	 0	 206	 410	2013	 0	 402	 0	 12	 402	2014	 0	 379	 0	 0	 379	Total	 4,108	 2,306	 34	 287	 6,414	This	 table	 demonstrates	 the	 distribution	 of	 reporting	 positions	 of	 CI	 for	 all	 bank	holding	companies	registered	with	SEC	from	1998	to	2014.		In	order	to	be	included	in	this	sample,	the	banks	need	to	be	covered	by	both	the	bank	regulatory	database	and	the	SEC	EDGAR	system.		For	the	reporting	position	data	of	CI	in	Table	1,	I	exclude	29	banks	that	either	(i)	did	not	consistently	use	the	same	reporting	method	of	CI	in	their	10-K	and	10-Q	filings	or	(ii)	have	a	comprehensive	income	statement	that	does	not	immediately	follow	the	income	 statements	 (i.e.	 Method	 4).	 	 I	 exclude	 these	 banks	 since	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	classify	them	as	either	Equity	Statement	Users	(i.e.	Method	3	users)	or	Performance	
Statement	Users	(i.e.	Method	1	or	2	Users).		For	each	fiscal	year,	Table	1	demonstrates	the	number	of	firms	presenting	CI	in	the	equity	statements	(Column	1),	the	number	of	firms	presenting	CI	in	the	performance	statements	(Column	2),	the	number	of	firms	that	switched	the	reporting	position	of	
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CI	from	the	performance	to	the	equity	statements	(Column	3),	the	number	of	firms	that	 switched	 the	 reporting	 position	 of	 CI	 from	 the	 equity	 to	 the	 performance	statements	 (Column	 4),	 and	 the	 total	 number	 of	 sample	 banks	 (Column	 5).	 	 This	sample	does	not	require	firms	to	have	the	regression	data	from	the	Bank	Regulatory	Database,	and	 therefore	 is	 larger	 than	 the	primary	sample	used	 for	 the	regression	tests	(see	Table	2).	
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Table	2.	Sample	Selection	and	Distribution	
	
Panel	A.	Sample	Selection		 	 	 	 		 Less	Firms	 Remaining	Firms	(Firm	No.)	 Less	Obs.	 Remaining		Obs.		(Firm-quarters)	Banks	with	data	in	the	Bank	Regulatory	Database	and	10-K/10-Q	filing	data	with	SEC	from	2010	to	2014	 	 500	 	 7,704	Less	banks:	 	 	 	 					without	4	years	10-K/10-Q	filings	or	Bank	Regulatory	data	during	2010–2013	 (215)*	 285	 (2,056)	 5,648					reported	OCI	in	a	separate	statement	following	the	SCSE	in	the	fiscal	years	before	2012	 (13)	 272	 (256)	 5,392					not	using	consistent	reporting	methods	of	OCI	in	their	10-K/10-Q	filings	before	2012	 (7)	 265	 (36)	 5,356					Switched	reporting	position	in	the	fiscal	year	2011	 (31)	 234	 (712)	 4,644					didn’t	adopt	ASU	2011-05	until	2013	 (5)	 229	 (92)	 4,552					without	necessary	data	for	the	regression	estimations	 (22)	 207	 (488)	 4,064		 	 	 	 	
Panel	B.	The	Distribution	of	Treatment	and	Control	Banks		 Treatment	Banks	 Control	Banks	Banks	 175	 32	Bank-quarter	observations	for	Equation	(2)	 3,444	 620	This	 table	 presents	 the	 sample	 selection	 process.	 	 I	 start	 with	 all	 bank	 holding	companies	registered	with	the	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	Chicago	in	Bank	Regulatory	Database	and	registered	with	SEC	from	2010	to	2014.		I	exclude	banks	(i)	without	at	least	4	 years	of	10-K/10-Q	 filing	or	Bank	Regulatory	data	 from	2010	 to	2013,	 (ii)	that	are	difficult	to	categorize	as	treatment	or	control	banks,	(iii)	that	switched	their	reporting	position	of	CI/OCI	 in	2011	or	2013,	and	(iv)	 that	do	not	have	necessary	data	from	the	Bank	Regulatory	and	COMPUSTAT	Databases	during	2010–2014.																																																									*			Of	the	215	banks,	118	do	not	have	4-years	of	10-K/10-Q	filings	in	the	SEC	Edgar	database,	and	97	do	not	have	4	years	of	Bank	Regulatory	data.	
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Treatment	 banks	 are	 those	 that	 always	 report	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	 equity	 statements	(Method	3	 in	Appendix	1)	before	adopting	ASU	2011-05	in	their	10-Q/10-K	filings	during	 2010–2011.	 	 Control	 banks	 are	 those	 that	 report	 CI/OCI	 in	 the	 income	statement	or	a	separate	statement	following	the	income	statement	(Methods	1	or	2	in	Appendix	1)	in	their	fiscal	years	2010–2011.			For	 the	primary	analyses	(Tables	6	and	7),	 I	have	4,064	observations	(207	banks)	with	 the	 necessary	 data	 available,	 comprising	 175	 treatment	 banks	 (3,444	observations)	and	32	control	banks	(620	observations).		
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Table	3.	Matching	Process	
	
	
Control	Banks		
N	=	256	 Treatment	Banks	before	Matching		N	=	1,400	 Difference	in	Mean	(1)	versus	(2)	 Treatment	Banks	after	Matching	N	=	256	 Difference	in	Mean	(1)	versus	(4)	
	
(1)	Mean	 (2)	Mean	 (3)	p-value	 (4)	Mean	 (5)	p-value	
Matching	Variables	!"#$	 0.078	 0.072	 0.19	 0.075	 0.66	%&'#$	 0.860	 0.907	 0.17	 0.884	 0.58	()*+#$	 15.367	 15.059	 0.01	 15.249	 0.45	,-(#$	 0.194	 0.178	 0.02	 0.189	 0.57	
Other	Variables	./!#$	 0.000	 0.000	 0.99	 0.000	 0.29	0)'.#$	 0.002	 0.001	 0.24	 0.001	 0.15	,1/!#$23	 0.001	 0.001	 0.38	 0.001	 0.98	.45678#$	 0.157	 0.154	 0.24	 0.152	 0.02	'954#$	 0.375	 0.443	 0.04	 0.500	 0.00	!;5,<7=#$	 0.739	 0.691	 0.47	 0.632	 0.17	!;5)<>?#$	 0.275	 0.305	 0.04	 0.292	 0.37	This	table	demonstrates	the	matching	process	of	 treatment	banks	to	control	banks	using	the	average	quarterly	 long-term	debt	ratio,	market-to-book	ratio,	size,	and	available-for-sale	security	level—all	assessed	in	the	pre-update	period	(2010	to	2011).		All	variables	are	defined	in	Appendix	2.	Column	(1)	presents	the	variable	means	for	the	control	banks	in	the	pre-update	period.		Column	(2)	presents	the	variable	means	for	the	treatment	banks	before	matching.		Column	(3)	presents	two-sided	p-values	of	t-tests	of	the	difference	between	the	variable	means	in	Columns	(1)	and	(2).		Column	(4)	presents	the	variable	means	for	the	treatment	banks	after	matching.	 	Column	(5)	presents	two-sided	p-value	of	t-tests	of	the	difference	between	the	variable	means	in	Columns	(1)	and	(4).		 	
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Table	4.	Descriptive	Statistics	
	
	 Panel	A	Treatment	Banks	before	Matching	N	=	3,444	 Panel	B	Treatment	Banks	after	Matching	N	=	628	 Panel	C	Control	Banks	N	=	620		 Mean	 Median	 Std.	Dev.	 Mean	 Median	 Std.	Dev.	 Mean	 Median	 Std.	Dev.	
Matching	Variables	!"#$ 	 0.061**	 0.048	 0.055	 0.064	 0.051	 0.049	 0.067	 0.040	 0.070	%&'#$ 	 1.052	 1.017	 0.515	 1.026	 0.995	 0.474	 1.016	 0.963	 0.524	()*+#$ 	 15.080***	 14.627	 1.710	 15.245	 14.748	 1.786	 15.355	 14.990	 1.592	,-(#$ 	 0.181***	 0.166	 0.099	 0.188	 0.164	 0.099	 0.195	 0.171	 0.118	
Other	Variables	./!#$ 	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	0)'.#$ 	 0.002	 0.003	 0.004	 0.002*	 0.003	 0.005	 0.002	 0.003	 0.004	,1/!#$23	 0.001	 0.001	 0.003	 0.001	 0.001	 0.002	 0.001	 0.001	 0.003	.45678#$ 	 0.155***	 0.149	 0.035	 0.153***	 0.148	 0.029	 0.160	 0.158	 0.030	'954#$ 	 0.436***	 0.000	 0.496	 0.478***	 0.000	 0.491	 0.355	 0.000	 0.479	!;5,<7=#$ 	 0.000	 −0.000	 0.000	 0.632*	 0.000	 0.859	 0.000	 −0.000	 0.000	!;5)<>?#$ 	 0.688***	 0.000	 0.963	 0.302*	 0.284	 0.188	 0.730	 0.000	 0.935	This	table	presents	the	descriptive	statistics	for	the	variables	used	to	generate	the	matched	treatment	sample	and	the	variables	used	in	the	regression	analyses	of	Equations	(2)	and	(4).		Two	quarterly	time-series	variables	are	not	included	in	the	above	table:	VIX	(volatility	index)	and	TED	(Ted	spread).	 	The	average	quarterly	VIX	proxy	in	my	test	period	is	17.58	and	the	average	quarterly	TED	proxy	in	my	test	period	is	0.26.		All	variables	are	defined	in	Appendix	2.		Panel	A	provides	the	descriptive	statistics	for	treatment	banks	before	matching	(175	banks).		Panel	B	presents	the	descriptive	statistics	for	treatment	banks	after	matching	(32	banks).	 	Panel	C	presents	the	descriptive	statistics	for	control	banks	(32	banks).		*,	**	and	***	denote	variable	means	that	are	significantly	different	across	treatment	and	control	banks.		 	
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Table	5.	Pearson	Correlation	Table	
	
Panel	A:	Pearson	Correlations	of	the	Whole	Sample	(N	=4,064	)			 	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13	 14	1	 Treat	 1.00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 Post	 0.00	 1.00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 ./!#$ 	 0.01	 −0.07	 1.00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 0)'.#$ 	 −0.02	 0.19	 −0.15	 1.00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 ,1/!#$23	 −0.01	 −0.04	 0.17	 0.04	 1.00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 .45678#$ 	 −0.05	 0.02	 −0.02	 0.23	 0.10	 1.00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	7	 ,-(#$ 	 −0.05	 0.02	 0.11	 0.02	 0.31	 0.25	 1.00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	8	 TEDq	 0.00	 0.06	 0.08	 −0.01	 0.21	 0.05	 0.05	 1.00	 	 	 	 	 	 	9	 VIXq	 0.00	 −0.74	 0.11	 −0.15	 0.15	 0.00	 0.01	 0.46	 1.00	 	 	 	 	 	10	 !"#$ 	 −0.03	 −0.15	 0.06	 0.01	 −0.07	 0.05	 −0.09	 0.00	 0.11	 1.00	 	 	 	 	11	 %&'#$ 	 0.02	 0.24	 −0.09	 0.36	 0.10	 0.08	 0.07	 −0.14	 −0.27	 −0.08	 1.00	 	 	 	12	 ()*+#$ 	 −0.06	 0.01	 −0.01	 0.14	 0.02	 −0.06	 −0.04	 0.01	 0.00	 0.23	 0.19	 1.00	 	 	13	 '954#$ 	 0.06	 −0.02	 −0.01	 0.12	 0.06	 −0.01	 0.00	 0.00	 0.01	 0.09	 0.23	 0.62	 1.00	 	14	 !;5,<7=#$ 	 −0.02	 0.00	 −0.01	 0.12	 0.03	 0.01	 −0.01	 0.00	 0.00	 0.01	 0.14	 0.25	 0.28	 1.00	15	 !;5)<>?#$ 	 0.05	 0.02	 −0.03	 0.19	 0.06	 0.06	 −0.05	 0.00	 −0.01	 −0.02	 0.32	 0.58	 0.45	 0.40		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 			 	
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Table	5.	Pearson	Correlation	Table	-	Continued		
Panel	B:	Pearson	Correlations	of	the	Matched	Sample	(N	=1,248)		 	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13	 14	1	 Treat	 1.00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 Post	 0.01	 1.00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 ./!#$ 	 0.04	 −0.12	 1.00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 0)'.#$ 	 −0.06	 0.16	 −0.18	 1.00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 ,1/!#$23	 0.02	 −0.05	 0.14	 0.08	 1.00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 .45678#$ 	 −0.12	 0.05	 0.04	 0.26	 0.15	 1.00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	7	 ,-(#$ 	 −0.03	 0.00	 0.13	 0.12	 0.31	 0.21	 1.00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	8	 TEDq	 0.00	 0.06	 0.07	 −0.04	 0.24	 0.04	 0.05	 1.00	 	 	 	 	 	 	9	 VIXq	 −0.01	 −0.74	 0.13	 −0.14	 0.18	 −0.02	 0.02	 0.46	 1.00	 	 	 	 	 	10	 !"#$ 	 −0.02	 −0.15	 0.05	 0.06	 −0.09	 0.06	 −0.20	 0.00	 0.12	 1.00	 	 	 	 	11	 %&'#$ 	 0.01	 0.25	 −0.14	 0.34	 0.16	 0.05	 0.21	 −0.17	 −0.29	 −0.11	 1.00	 	 	 	12	 ()*+#$ 	 −0.03	 0.00	 −0.02	 0.16	 −0.06	 −0.04	 −0.08	 0.01	 0.01	 0.38	 0.19	 1.00	 	 	13	 '954#$ 	 0.12	 −0.04	 −0.02	 0.12	 0.04	 −0.15	 0.06	 0.00	 0.03	 0.25	 0.27	 0.65	 1.00	 	14	 !;5,<7=#$ 	 −0.05	 0.00	 −0.05	 0.13	 0.08	 0.03	 0.07	 0.01	 0.01	 −0.07	 0.11	 0.07	 0.16	 1.00	15	 !;5)<>?#$ 	 0.05	 0.03	 −0.03	 0.16	 0.09	 −0.08	 −0.02	 −0.02	 −0.03	 0.00	 0.38	 0.48	 0.45	 0.45	This	table	presents	Pearson	correlations	for	the	whole	bank	sample	(175	treatment	plus	32	control	banks)	in	Panel	A,	and	for	the	matched	bank	sample	(32	treatment	plus	32	control	banks)	in	Panel	B.		Significant	correlation	coefficients	are	 bolded	 at	 the	 0.05	 level.	 	 Matching	 variables	 and	 all	 the	 control	 variables	 used	 in	 the	 regression	 analyses	 of	Equations	(2)	and	(4)	are	included	in	Panel	A	and	B.			 	
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Table	6.	Reporting	Positions	of	CI/OCI	and	Selective	Sales	of	AFS	securities		
	 	 	 Exp.	 (1)	Whole	Sample	 (2)	Matched	Sample		 	 Sign	 Coefficient	 T-stat	 Coefficient	 T-stat	(@;;?ℎ0)#$ 	 β1	 ?	 −0.01851	 −1.14	 −0.01871	 −1.19	'95B7?ℎ0)#$ 	 β2	 ?	 −0.00996	 −0.96	 −0.01008	 −0.83	CDEFG×IJKKGLMNOP		(H1)	 β3	 −	 					−0.04784***	 −2.59	 					−0.09019***	 −3.23	CDEFG	×ROSTFGLMNOP	(H1)	 β4	 +	 0.01612	 1.22	 0.01679	 0.88	UV(&×(@;;?ℎ0)#$ 	 β5		 ?	 −0.01040	 −0.67	 −0.01055	 −0.70	UV(&×'95B7?ℎ0)#$ 	 β6	 ?	 0.02616	 1.46	 0.02666	 1.41	CDEFG×WXIC×IJKKGLMNOP	(H2)	 β7	 +	 						0.03027**	 1.95	 						0.04562**	 1.74	CDEFG×WXIC×ROSTFGLMNOP	(H2)	 β8	 −	 			−0.04067**	 −1.78	 		−0.05055*	 −1.50	,1/!#$23	 β9	 +	 							0.02559***	 5.62	 								0.02622***	 3.29	.45678#$ 	 β10	 −	 			−0.00071**	 −2.26	 −0.00032	 −0.50	,-(#$ 	 β11	 ?	 		0.00014	 0.59	 −0.00001	 −0.03	&+"$ 	 β12	 ?	 0.00009	 0.42	 0.00004	 0.19	Y)Z$ 	 β13	 ?	 0.00000	 0.73	 0.00000	 0.60	UV(&	 β14	 ?	 0.00004	 0.19	 0.00003	 0.16	&[47?×UV(&	 β15	 ?	 −0.00021	 −1.06	 −0.00009	 −0.28	)<\(@;;?ℎ	 β16	 ?	 −0.00002	 −0.17	 −0.00002	 −0.21	&[47?×)<\(@;;?ℎ	 β17	 ?	 0.00003	 0.30	 0.00007	 0.38	U;>?×)<\(@;;?ℎ	 β18	 ?	 −0.00001	 −0.08	 −0.00002	 −0.12	&[47?×U;>?×)<\(@;;?ℎ	 β19	 ?	 0.00016	 0.93	 −0.00001	 −0.04	
Firm	Fixed	Effects	 	 	 Yes	 Yes	
N	 	 	 4,064	 1,248	
Adj.	R-squared	 	 	 0.268	 0.325	
β1+	β3	 	 −	 						−0.06635***	 −6.31	 					−0.10890***	 −4.29	
β1+	β3+	β5+	β7	 	 ?	 						−0.04648***	 −4.97	 					−0.07383***	 −3.42	
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This	 table	 presents	 the	 estimation	 results	 of	 Equation	 (2)	 with	 the	 whole	 sample	 (Column	 1)	 and	 the	 matched	subsample	(Column	2).		For	both	tests,	the	dependent	variable	is	./!#$ .		For	the	whole	sample,	N	=	3,444	bank	quarters	for	treatment	banks	and	620	for	control	banks.	 	For	the	matched	sample,	N	=	628	bank	quarters	for	treatment	banks	and	620	for	control	banks.		T-statistics	are	based	on	standard	errors	clustered	by	bank	and	quarter.		***,	**,	*	indicate	variables	significant	at	the	0.01,	0.05	and	0.1	level,	using	one-sided	(two-sided)	t-tests	for	variables	having	predicted	signs	(no	predicted	signs).		 	
β5+	β7	 	 +	 						0.01987**	 2.08	 				0.03507*	 1.63	
β2+	β4	 	 +	 						0.00616**	 1.97	 		0.00672	 0.48	
β2+	β4+	β6+	β8	 	 ?	 −0.00835	 −0.63	 −0.01718	 −0.75	
β6+	β8	 	 −	 −0.01452	 −1.14	 −0.02390	 −0.93	
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Table	7.	Placebo	Tests	 	
Panel	A:	Placebo	Test	with	the	Whole	Sample		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	Post-period	 UV(&×(@;;?ℎ0)#$ 	 UV(&×'95B7?ℎ0)#$ 	 &[47?×UV(&×(@;;?ℎ0)#$ 	 &[47?×UV(&×'95B7?ℎ0)#$ 	starts	from:	 β5	 P-value	 β6	 P-value	 β7	(+)	 P-value	 β8	(−)	 P-value	2010q3	 0.001	 0.937	 0.053	 0.379	 0.012	 0.240	 −0.068	 0.150	2010q4	 0.010	 0.665	 0.118	 0.235	 0.006	 0.407	 −0.134	 0.091	2011q1	 0.002	 0.923	 0.025	 0.587	 0.015	 0.266	 −0.032	 0.269	2011q2	 −0.001	 0.950	 0.032	 0.546	 0.010	 0.326	 −0.043	 0.224	2011q3	 −0.011	 0.580	 0.020	 0.499	 0.015	 0.250	 −0.036	 0.139	2011q4	 −0.007	 0.695	 0.019	 0.413	 0.019	 0.166	 −0.032	 0.119	2012q1	 −0.010	 0.510	 0.026	 0.160	 0.030	 0.033	 −0.041	 0.045	2012q2	 −0.014	 0.265	 0.025	 0.174	 0.038	 0.001	 −0.027	 0.106	2012q3	 −0.020	 0.186	 0.027	 0.168	 0.045	 0.001	 −0.025	 0.137	2012q4	 −0.003	 0.798	 −0.003	 0.849	 0.029	 0.009	 0.008	 0.648	2013q1	 0.011	 0.481	 0.004	 0.815	 0.017	 0.165	 −0.008	 0.355	2013q2	 0.008	 0.588	 0.004	 0.790	 0.021	 0.101	 −0.009	 0.332	2013q3	 0.015	 0.119	 −0.003	 0.769	 0.013	 0.167	 −0.001	 0.478	2013q4	 0.012	 0.217	 0.058	 0.000	 0.014	 0.173	 −0.072	 0.000	2014q1	 0.015	 0.219	 −0.017	 0.190	 0.004	 0.391	 0.000	 N.A.	2014q2	 0.001	 0.968	 −0.024	 0.120	 0.018	 0.265	 0.000	 N.A.	2014q3	 −0.018	 0.341	 −0.042	 0.054	 0.041	 0.010	 0.000	 N.A.		 	
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Table	7.	Placebo	Tests	-	Continued	 	
Panel	B:	Placebo	Test	with	the	Matched	Subsample		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	Post-period	 UV(&×(@;;?ℎ0)#$ 	 UV(&×'95B7?ℎ0)#$ 	 &[47?×UV(&×(@;;?ℎ0)#$ 	 &[47?×UV(&×'95B7?ℎ0)#$ 	starts	from:	 β5	 P-value	 β6	 P-value	 β7	(+)	 P-value	 β8	(−)	 P-value	2010q3	 −0.001	 0.942	 0.050	 0.370	 −0.054	 0.871	 −0.088	 0.094	2010q4	 0.008	 0.724	 0.104	 0.239	 0.002	 0.482	 −0.136	 0.069	2011q1	 0.001	 0.954	 0.024	 0.612	 0.049	 0.144	 −0.055	 0.168	2011q2	 −0.002	 0.925	 0.031	 0.567	 0.034	 0.232	 −0.062	 0.163	2011q3	 −0.011	 0.579	 0.020	 0.516	 0.034	 0.192	 −0.058	 0.090	2011q4	 −0.007	 0.691	 0.020	 0.435	 0.043	 0.073	 −0.057	 0.070	2012q1	 −0.011	 0.494	 0.027	 0.176	 0.046	 0.049	 −0.051	 0.076	2012q2	 −0.014	 0.225	 0.026	 0.186	 0.063	 0.002	 −0.023	 0.211	2012q3	 −0.020	 0.161	 0.027	 0.183	 0.058	 0.006	 −0.019	 0.259	2012q4	 −0.003	 0.839	 −0.003	 0.883	 0.030	 0.106	 0.014	 0.703	2013q1	 0.012	 0.475	 0.003	 0.848	 0.014	 0.293	 0.145	 0.786	2013q2	 0.008	 0.597	 0.003	 0.836	 0.008	 0.372	 0.143	 0.784	2013q3	 0.015	 0.124	 −0.004	 0.631	 0.001	 0.482	 0.149	 0.801	2013q4	 0.014	 0.185	 0.060	 0.000	 0.000	 0.494	 −0.226	 0.000	2014q1	 0.016	 0.194	 −0.175	 0.000	 −0.019	 0.877	 0.000	 N.A.	2014q2	 0.003	 0.903	 −0.174	 0.000	 −0.001	 0.512	 0.000	 N.A.	2014q3	 −0.016	 0.391	 0.379	 0.030	 0.019	 0.099	 0.000	 N.A.	This	table	presents	the	placebo	tests	results	of	Equation	(2)	with	both	the	whole	sample	and	the	matched	subsample.		P-values	 are	 based	 on	 t-tests	 (two-sided	without	 a	 signed	 prediction	 and	 one-sided	with	 a	 signed	 prediction),	with	standard	errors	clustered	by	bank	and	quarter.		The	significant	coefficients	at	0.05	are	bolded	in	Panel	A	and	Panel	B.		Control	banks	do	not	have	one	observation	with	non-zero	'95B7?ℎ0)#$ 	in	2014.		
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Table	8.	Cross-sectional	Tests	with	the	Treatment	Banks		
Panel	A.	Cross-sectional	Test:	Big4	and	non-Big4	Audited		
	
Panel	B.	Cross-sectional	Test:	The	Effects	of	Institutional	Ownership	
		 	
	 	 Exp.	 Y-variable=!"#$% 		 	 Sign	 Coefficient	 			T-stat.	&'(()ℎ+,$% 	 β1	 −	 			−0.06663***	 −4.80	-./01)ℎ+,$% 	 β2	 +	 0.00362	 1.04	2345×7899:;<=3>			 β3	 ?	 0.01813	 0.83	2345×234?@:;<=3>		 β4	 ?	 0.00086	 0.28	AB&C×&'(()ℎ+,$% 	 β5		 +	 0.00810	 0.62	AB&C×-./01)ℎ+,$% 	 β6	 −	 0.00058	 0.09	2345×DE7F×7899:;<=3>		 β7	 ?	 		0.02702*	 2.03	2345×DE7F×234?@:;<=3>		 β8	 ?	 			−0.06608***	 −3.43	
Other	Controls	and	Interaction	Terms	 	 	 Yes	
Firm	fixed	effects	 	 	 Yes	
N	 	 	 3,444	
Adj.	R-squared	 	 	 0.268	
	 	 Exp.	 Y-variable=!"#$% 		 	 Sign	 Coefficient	 			T-stat.	&'(()ℎ+,$% 	 β1	 −	 			−0.07730***	 −5.62	-./01)ℎ+,$% 	 β2	 +	 0.00320	 0.86	=GH:9IG×7899:;<=3>			 β3	 ?	 				0.04819**	 2.63	=GH:9IG×234?@:;<=3>		 β4	 ?	 0.00385	 0.55	AB&C×&'(()ℎ+,$% 	 β5		 +	 						0.03393***	 2.67	AB&C×-./01)ℎ+,$% 	 β6	 −	 					−0.00051	 −0.08	=GH:9IG×DE7F×7899:;<=3>		 β7	 ?	 					−0.02370	 −1.43	=GH:9IG×DE7F×234?@:;<=3>		 β8	 ?	 				−0.07338***	 −5.61	
Other	Controls	and	Interaction	Terms	 	 	 Yes	
Firm	fixed	effects	 	 	 Yes	
N	 	 	 3,444	
Adj.	R-squared	 	 	 0.268	
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Table	8.	Cross-sectional	Tests	with	the	Treatment	Banks	-	Continued		
Panel	C.	Cross-sectional	Test:	The	Effect	of	Analysts	Following	
This	 table	 presents	 results	 of	 cross-sectional	 tests	 for	 a	 subsample	 of	 treatment	banks	(i.e.	175	treatment	banks	with	3,444	observations).	 	 I	estimate	Equation	(2)	with	the	indicator	variable	Treat	replaced	by	(1)	an	indicator	variable	of	using	a	Big	4	auditor	(i.e.	Big4	in	Panel	A);	(2)	an	indicator	variable	of	having	a	high	percentage	of	institutional	ownership	(i.e.	Instown	in	Panel	B);	and	(3)	an	indicator	variable	of	having	a	large	number	of	analysts	following	(i.e.	Analyst	in	Panel	C).			In	 all	 the	 above	 regression	 analyses,	 the	dependent	 variable	 is	!"#$% .	 	 In	Panel	A,	
Big4=1	 if	 a	 bank	 is	 audited	 by	 a	 Big	 4	 audit	 firm,	 and	 0	 otherwise.	 	 Within	 the	treatment	 bank	 sample,	 84	 of	 175	 treatment	 banks	 have	 Big4=1.	 	 In	 Panel	 B,	
Instown=1	 if	 the	 bank’s	 institutional	 ownership	 percentage	 is	 larger	 than	 the	 75	percentile	 of	 the	 total	 treatment	 banks	 observations.	 	Within	 the	 treatment	 bank	sample,	 861	 of	 3,444	 observations	 have	 Instown=1.	 	 In	 Panel	 C,	 Analyst=1	 if	 the	bank’s	quarterly	average	analysts	 following	 is	 above	 the	75	percentile	of	 the	 total	treatment	 bank	 observations.	 	 Within	 the	 treatment	 bank	 sample,	 773	 of	 3,444	observations	have	Analyst=1.		All	other	variables	are	defined	in	Appendix	2.		
T-statistics	are	based	on	standard	errors	clustered	by	bank	and	quarter.	 	 ***,	 **,	 *	indicate	variables	 significant	at	 the	0.01,	0.05	and	0.1	 level,	using	one-sided	 (two-sided)	tests	for	variables	having	predicted	signs	(no	predicted	signs).			
	 	 Exp.	 Y-variable=!"#$% 		 	 Sign	 Coefficient	 			T-stat.	&'(()ℎ+,$% 	 β1	 −	 			−0.07473***	 −6.09	-./01)ℎ+,$% 	 β2	 +	 0.00489	 1.42	JG@KLH:×7899:;<=3>			 β3	 ?	 						0.07006***	 4.94	JG@KLH:×234?@:;<=3>		 β4	 ?	 0.00101	 0.10	AB&C×&'(()ℎ+,$% 	 β5		 +	 				0.02468**	 2.26	AB&C×-./01)ℎ+,$% 	 β6	 −	 							−0.01488	 −1.17	JG@KLH:×DE7F×7899:;<=3>		 β7	 ?	 							−0.01554	 −0.90	JG@KLH:×DE7F×234?@:;<=3>		 β8	 ?	 						0.05983***	 3.19	
Other	Controls	and	Interaction	Terms	 	 	 Yes	
Firm	fixed	effects	 	 	 Yes	
N	 	 	 3,444	
Adj.	R-squared	 	 	 0.266	
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Table	9.	Reporting	Position	of	CI/OCI	and	Discretionary	Realized	Gains	and	Losses	
	
Panel	A.	Estimations	without	Restrictions	on	!"#$%&		 	 	 Whole	Sample	 Matched	Sample		 	 Exp.	 '()*+,>0	 '()*+,<0	 -./_'()*+, 	 '()*+,>0	 '()*+,<0	 -./_'()*+, 	
	 	 Sign	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Intercept	 α1	 +/−	 0.026	 −0.015**	 0.020***	 0.022	 −0.015*	 0.018	
	 	 	 (1.63)	 (−2.31)	 (2.27)	 (1.14)	 (−1.67)	 (1.51)	
Treat	(H1)	 α2	 +/−	 0.007	 −0.004**	 0.005**	 0.013*	 −0.001	 0.004	
	 	 	 (1.15)	 (−2.14)	 (1.76)	 (1.71)	 (−0.57)	 (1.22)	
Treat	×	POST	(H2)	 α3	 −/+	 −0.006	 0.004**	 −0.004**	 −0.013*	 0.000	 −0.004*	
	 	 	 (−0.89)	 (2.26)	 (−1.78)	 (−1.71)	 (0.31)	 (−1.43)	
POST	 α4	 ?	 −0.007	 0.000	 −0.003	 −0.005	 0.001	 −0.003	
	 	 	 (−0.91)	 (0.08)	 (−0.95)	 (−0.84)	 (0.67)	 (−1.08)	*'+, 	 α5	 ?	 0.042	 −0.032*	 0.039**		 0.027	 −0.002	 0.011	
	 	 	 (1.66)	 (−2.02)	 (2.54)	 (0.84)	 (−0.17)	 (0.66)	123+, 	 α6	 ?	 −0.008**	 0.003*	 −0.005**		 −0.013**	 0.003	 −0.007**		
	 	 	 (−2.66)	 (1.83)	 (−2.75)	 (−2.35)	 (1.52)	 (−2.42)	4567+, 	 α7	 ?	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	
	 	 	 (−0.36)	 (0.62)	 (−0.64)	 (−0.19)	 (0.31)	 (−0.21)	3894+, 	 α8	 ?	 −0.001	 0.001	 −0.001	 −0.006	 0.000	 −0.002	
	 	 	 (−0.23)	 (0.59)	 (−0.42)	 (−1.09)	 (0.18)	 (−0.72)	-;4+, 	 α9	 ?	 0.051***	 −0.032***	 0.040***	 0.074**	 −0.035***	 0.050***	
	 	 	 (3.82)	 (−4.99)	 (5.28)	 (2.64)	 (−4.70)	 (4.50)	*<9-=>?+, 	 α10	 ?	 −0.001	 0.000	 0.000	 −0.003	 0.002	 −0.003*		
	 	 	 (−0.79)	 (−0.06)	 (−0.48)	 (−1.49)	 (1.69)	 (−1.84)	*<95=/@+, 	 α11	 ?	 0.001	 0.008**	 −0.004	 0.024**	 0.000	 0.010	
	 	 	 (0.22)	 (2.21)	 (−0.96)	 (2.11)	 (0.07)	 (1.38)	
N	 	 	 1,674	 2,390	 4,064	 506	 742	 1,248	
Adj	R−squared	 	 	 0.098	 0.061	 0.068	 0.127	 0.093	 0.078	
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Panel	B.	Estimations	without	!"#$%&=	#%BCDEF!"%&		 	 	 Whole	Sample	 Matched	Sample		 	 Exp.	 '()*+,>0	 '()*+,<0	 -./_'()*+, 	 '()*+,>0	 '()*+,<0	 -./_'()*+, 	
	 	 Sign	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Intercept	 α1	 +/−	 0.018	 −0.012**	 0.015**	 0.006	 −0.015**	 0.011	
	 	 	 (1.17)	 (−2.17)	 (1.85)	 (0.32)	 (−1.74)	 (1.00)	
Treat	(H1)	 α2	 +/−	 0.007*	 −0.005**	 0.005***	 0.012*	 −0.002	 0.005*	
	 	 	 (1.56)	 (−2.51)	 (2.71)	 (1.69)	 (−0.85)	 (1.55)	
Treat	×	POST	(H2)	 α3	 −/+	 −0.007*	 0.005***	 −0.005***	 −0.013**	 0.001	 −0.005**		
	 	 	 (−1.34)	 (2.93)	 (−3.09)	 (−2.11)	 (0.67)	 (−2.14)	
POST	 α4	 ?	 −0.004	 −0.001	 −0.001	 −0.004	 0.000	 −0.002	
	 	 	 (−0.71)	 (−0.47)	 (−0.55)	 (−0.75)	 (0.15)	 (−0.69)	*'+, 	 α5	 ?	 0.036*	 −0.028**	 0.033**		 0.016	 −0.005	 0.009	
	 	 	 (1.91)	 (−2.15)	 (2.56)	 (0.54)	 (−0.43)	 (0.55)	123+, 	 α6	 ?	 −0.007**	 0.002	 −0.004**		 −0.010**	 0.003	 −0.006**		
	 	 	 (−2.39)	 (1.47)	 (−2.28)	 (−2.13)	 (1.34)	 (−2.10)	4567+, 	 α7	 ?	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.001	 0.000	 0.000	
	 	 	 (−0.15)	 (0.43)	 (−0.41)	 (0.53)	 (0.60)	 (0.14)	3894+, 	 α8	 ?	 −0.001	 0.001	 −0.001	 −0.006	 0.000	 −0.003	
	 	 	 (−0.33)	 (0.66)	 (−0.52)	 (−1.28)	 (0.14)	 (−1.07)	-;4+, 	 α9	 ?	 0.055***	 −0.031***	 0.041***	 0.071**	 −0.035***	 0.048***	
	 	 	 (3.92)	 (−5.10)	 (5.40)	 (2.62)	 (−5.03)	 (4.86)	*<9-=>?+, 	 α10	 ?	 −0.001	 0.000	 0.000	 −0.002	 0.002*	 −0.002	
	 	 	 (−0.68)	 (−0.01)	 (−0.47)	 (−0.94)	 (1.88)	 (−1.58)	*<95=/@+, 	 α11	 ?	 0.003	 0.007*	 −0.003	 0.014	 −0.003	 0.007	
	 	 	 (0.55)	 (2.03)	 (−0.67)	 (1.33)	 (−0.60)	 (1.12)	
N	 	 	 1,562	 2,179	 3,741	 466	 682	 1,148	
Adj	R-squared	 	 	 0.094	 0.057	 0.066	 0.126	 0.099	 0.083	
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This	 table	 presents	 the	 estimation	 results	 of	 Equation	 (4)	 in	 Section	 6.3.	 	 Panel	 A	 presents	 the	 regression	 results	without	any	restrictions	on	earnings	before	realized	gains	and	losses	(G53(+,).		Panel	B	presents	the	regression	results	excluding	 observations	 that	 have	 extremely	 low	 earnings	 (i.e.	G53(+,=	4H<<@ℎG5+,).	 	 All	 variables	 are	 defined	 in	Appendix	2.		Coefficient	estimates	are	provided	with	T-statistics	in	parentheses.		Coefficient	estimates	are	multiplied	by	100	 for	 expositional	 convenience.	 	 Standard	 errors	 are	 clustered	 by	 bank	 and	 quarter.	 	 ***,	 **,	 *	 indicate	 variables	significant	at	 the	0.01,0.05	and	0.1	 level,	using	one-sided	(two-sided)	 t-tests	 for	variables	having	predicted	signs	(no	predicted	signs).		When	positive	(negative)	'()*+, 	is	the	dependent	variable,	I	expect	the	coefficient	on	2JK>@+ 	to	be	positive	(negative)	and	 significant	 (H1)	 and	 the	 coefficient	 on	2JK>@+×MN42O	to	 be	 negative	 (positive)	 and	 significant	 (H2).	 	 When	-./_'()*+, 	is	 the	 dependent	 variable,	 I	 expect	 the	 coefficient	 on	2JK>@+ 	to	 be	 positive	 and	 significant	 (H1)	 and	 the	coefficient	on	2JK>@+×MN42O	to	be	negative	and	significant	(H2).		 	
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Table	10.	Sensitivity	Tests	Using	Alternative	Model	Specifications	
	
Panel	A.	Alternative	Earnings	and	Regulatory	Capital	Targets	(Dependent	Variable	=	$PQ%&)	
	
	 	 Exp.	 (1)	Whole	Sample	 (2)	Matched	Sample		 	 Sign	 Coefficient	 T-stat	 Coefficient	 T-stat	>.4H<<@ℎG5+, 	 β1	 ?	 −0.01280	 −0.99	 −0.01364	 −1.09	>.389.>@ℎG5+, 	 β2	 ?	 −0.00491	 −0.45	 −0.00629	 −0.51	RSTDE×DCUVWWEF!"%&		(H1)	 β3	 −	 					−0.05025***	 −3.26	 			−0.07487**	 −2.44	RSTDE	×DC#%BCDEF!"%&	(H1)	 β4	 +	 0.01076	 0.78	 0.01174	 0.61	MN42×>.4H<<@ℎG5+, 	 β5		 ?	 −0.01525	 −1.04	 −0.01397	 −0.92	MN42×>.389.>@ℎG5+, 	 β6	 ?	 0.02100	 1.17	 0.02261	 1.20	RSTDE×XYUR×DCUVWWEF!"%&	(H2)	 β7	 +	 								0.03555***	 2.47	 				0.03839*	 1.44	RSTDE×XYUR×DC#%BCDEF!"%&	(H2)	 β8	 −	 		−0.03469*	 −1.55	 		−0.04491*	 −1.36	-Z)*+,[\	 β9	 +	 								0.02614***	 5.36	 								0.02647***	 3.24	>.(K9]>^+, 	 β10	 −	 				−0.00072**	 −2.29	 −0.00028	 −0.44	-;4+, 	 β11	 ?	 0.00014	 0.58	 0.00001	 0.02	27', 	 β12	 ?	 0.00009	 0.37	 0.00004	 0.17	_5`, 	 β13	 ?	 0.00000	 0.58	 0.00000	 0.30	MN42	 β14	 ?	 0.00005	 0.26	 0.00005	 0.30	2JK>@×MN42	 β15	 ?	 −0.00026	 −1.20	 −0.00017	 −0.44	5=a4H<<@ℎ	 β16	 ?	 −0.00006	 −0.58	 −0.00005	 −0.60	2JK>@×5=a4H<<@ℎ	 β17	 ?	 −0.00004	 −0.33	 −0.00008	 −0.40	M</@×5=a4H<<@ℎ	 β18	 ?	 −0.00008	 −0.50	 −0.00010	 −0.62	2JK>@×M</@×5=a4H<<@ℎ	 β19	 ?	 0.00025	 1.17	 0.00010	 0.26	
Firm	Fixed	Effects	 	 	 Yes	 Yes	
N	 	 	 4,064	 1,248	
Adj.	R-squared	 	 	 0.266	 0.316	
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Table	10.	Sensitivity	Tests	Using	Alternative	Model	Specifications	-	Continued	
	
Panel	B.	Controlling	for	Cash	and	Cash	Equivalent	(Dependent	Variable	=	$PQ%&)		 	 Exp.	 (1)	Whole	Sample	 (2)	Matched	Sample		 	 Sign	 Coefficient	 T-stat	 Coefficient	 T-stat	4H<<@ℎG5+, 	 β1	 ?	 −0.01925	 −1.18	 −0.02030	 −1.26	389.>@ℎG5+, 	 β2	 ?	 −0.01011	 −0.97	 −0.01013	 −0.83	RSTDE×UVWWEF!"%&		(H1)	 β3	 −	 						−0.04743***	 −2.58	 						−0.08690***	 −3.16	RSTDE	×#%BCDEF!"%&	(H1)	 β4	 +	 0.01632	 1.22	 		0.01673	 0.89	MN42×4H<<@ℎG5+, 	 β5		 ?	 −0.00998	 −0.64	 −0.00969	 −0.63	MN42×389.>@ℎG5+, 	 β6	 ?	 0.02648	 1.48	 		0.02705	 1.41	RSTDE×XYUR×UVWWEF!"%&	(H2)	 β7	 +	 						0.03049**	 1.97	 						0.04535**	 1.75	RSTDE×XYUR×#%BCDEF!"%&	(H2)	 β8	 −	 				−0.04126**	 −1.80	 		−0.05125*	 −1.51	-Z)*+,[\	 β9	 +	 								0.02553***	 5.60	 								0.02629***	 3.31	(K9]>^+, 	 β10	 −	 		−0.00054*	 −1.66	 −0.00005	 −0.07	-;4+, 	 β11	 ?	 0.00012	 0.49	 −0.00002	 −0.06	27', 	 β12	 ?	 0.00009	 0.40	 0.00003	 0.15	_5`, 	 β13	 ?	 0.00000	 0.73	 0.00000	 0.61	MN42	 β14	 ?	 0.00004	 0.19	 0.00002	 0.15	2JK>@×MN42	 β15	 ?	 −0.00021	 −1.07	 −0.00010	 −0.30	5=a4H<<@ℎ	 β16	 ?	 −0.00002	 −0.19	 −0.00003	 −0.27	2JK>@×5=a4H<<@ℎ	 β17	 ?	 0.00003	 0.31	 0.00007	 0.38	M</@×5=a4H<<@ℎ	 β18	 ?	 −0.00001	 −0.08	 −0.00001	 −0.10	2JK>@×M</@×5=a4H<<@ℎ	 β19	 ?	 0.00016	 0.93	 −0.00001	 −0.03	]>/ℎ+,	 β	20	 ?	 −0.00123	 −0.87	 −0.00257	 −1.58	
Firm	Fixed	Effects	 	 	 Yes	 Yes	
N	 	 	 4,064	 1,248	
Adj.	R-squared	 	 	 0.268	 0.325	
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Table	10.	Sensitivity	Tests	with	Alternative	Models	-	Continued		
Panel	C.	Alternative	Dependent	Variable	(Dependent	Variable	=	b$PQ%&)	
	
	 	 Exp.	 (1)	Whole	Sample	 (2)	Matched	Sample		 	 Sign	 Coefficient	 T-stat	 Coefficient	 T-stat	4H<<@ℎG5+, 	 β1	 ?	 −0.02040	 −1.30	 −0.01968	 −1.32	389.>@ℎG5+, 	 β2	 ?	 −0.00902	 −0.74	 −0.01243	 −0.88	RSTDE×UVWWEF!"%&		(H1)	 β3	 −	 						−0.04684***	 −2.65	 					−0.09125***	 −3.30	RSTDE	×#%BCDEF!"%&	(H1)	 β4	 +	 		0.01525	 1.05	 0.01892	 0.90	MN42×4H<<@ℎG5+, 	 β5		 ?	 −0.01003	 −0.67	 −0.00913	 −0.61	MN42×389.>@ℎG5+, 	 β6	 ?	 		0.02314	 1.25	 0.02641	 1.34	RSTDE×XYUR×UVWWEF!"%&	(H2)	 β7	 +	 						0.02856**	 1.90	 				0.04407*	 1.68	RSTDE×XYUR×#%BCDEF!"%&	(H2)	 β8	 −	 		−0.03686*	 −1.58	 	−0.05026*	 −1.43	-Z)*+,[\	 β9	 +	 −0.00175	 −0.45	 −0.00080	 −0.10	(K9]>^+, 	 β10	 −	 0.00015	 0.43	 0.00072	 1.27	-;4+, 	 β11	 ?	 0.00001	 0.04	 −0.00005	 −0.15	27', 	 β12	 ?	 −0.00004	 −0.74	 −0.00014	 −1.31	_5`, 	 β13	 ?	 0.00000	 1.01	 0.00000	 0.41	MN42	 β14	 ?	 0.00006	 0.36	 0.00008	 0.54	2JK>@×MN42	 β15	 ?	 −0.00019	 −0.93	 −0.00013	 −0.38	5=a4H<<@ℎ	 β16	 ?	 −0.00002	 −0.20	 −0.00000	 −0.02	2JK>@×5=a4H<<@ℎ	 β17	 ?	 0.00004	 0.35	 0.00004	 0.21	M</@×5=a4H<<@ℎ	 β18	 ?	 0.00000	 0.01	 −0.00002	 −0.16	2JK>@×M</@×5=a4H<<@ℎ	 β19	 ?	 0.00014	 0.78	 0.00003	 0.08	
Firm	Fixed	Effects	 	 	 Yes	 Yes	
N	 	 	 4,064	 1,248	
R-squared	 	 	 0.044	 0.074	
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Table	10.	Sensitivity	Tests	with	Alternative	Models	-	Continued		
Panel	D.	Alternative	Definition	of	Big	Bath	Earnings	Management	(Dependent	Variable	=	$PQ%&)		 	 Exp.	 (1)	Whole	Sample	 (2)	Matched	Sample		 	 Sign	 Coefficient	 T-stat	 Coefficient	 T-stat	M</8G5+, 	 β1	 ?	 −0.00963	 −0.73	 −0.00975	 −0.83	GK9G5+, 	 β2	 ?	 −0.00363	 −0.27	 −0.00380	 −0.26	RSTDE×XWc%!"%&		(H1)	 β3	 −	 						−0.04667***	 −2.67	 						−0.08110***	 −2.63	RSTDE	×!TB!"%&	(H1)	 β4	 +	 0.01330	 0.88	 0.01708	 0.87	MN42×M</8G5+, 	 β5		 ?	 −0.00494	 −0.38	 −0.00493	 −0.42	MN42×GK9G5+, 	 β6	 ?	 						0.03737**	 2.10	 						0.03836**	 2.07	RSTDE×XYUR×XWc%!"%&	(H2)	 β7	 +	 						0.02455**	 1.79	 0.02502	 1.01	RSTDE×XYUR×!TB!"%&	(H2)	 β8	 −	 			−0.04410**	 −2.23	 						−0.06929***	 −2.14	-Z)*+,[\	 β9	 +	 								0.02585***	 5.66	 								0.02461***	 3.10	(K9]>^+, 	 β10	 −	 		−0.00055*	 −1.67	 −0.00011	 −0.17	-;4+, 	 β11	 ?	 0.00020	 0.87	 0.00003	 0.11	27', 	 β12	 ?	 0.00008	 0.38	 0.00000	 0.02	_5`, 	 β13	 ?	 0.00000	 0.71	 0.00000	 0.67	MN42	 β14	 ?	 0.00018	 1.26	 0.00017	 1.49	2JK>@×MN42	 β15	 ?	 −0.00026	 −1.59	 −0.00039	 −1.34	5=aM</8	 β16	 ?	 			−0.00012**	 −2.23	 				−0.00012**	 −2.53	2JK>@×5=aM</8	 β17	 ?	 0.00001	 0.25	 −0.00004	 −0.28	M</@×5=aM</8	 β18	 ?	 	−0.00017*	 −1.85	 			−0.00018**	 −2.17	2JK>@×M</@×5=aM</8	 β19	 ?	 0.00024	 1.73	 0.00035	 1.23	
Firm	Fixed	Effects	 	 	 Yes	 Yes	
N	 	 	 4,064	 1,248	
Adj.	R-squared	 	 	 0.267	 0.333	
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This	 table	presents	 the	sensitivity	analyses	with	several	 transforms	of	Equation	 (2).	 	 In	each	Panel,	 the	analyses	are	conducted	on	both	the	whole	sample	and	the	matched	subsample.				In	 Panel	 A,	>.4H<<@ℎG5+, 	equals	G53(+, − HG53(,[\ 	if	G53(+, >0	 or	G53(+, +	-Z)*,[\ 	>0	 and	 0	 otherwise;	>.389.>@ℎG5+, 	equals	 G53(+, − HG53(,[\ 	if	 G53(+, <0	 and	 G53(+, +	-Z)*,[\ 	<0,	 and	 0	 otherwise;	>.(K9]>^+,,equals	(K9]>^+, − H(K9]>^,[\.	 	HG53(,[\	(H(K9]>^,[\)	 represents	 the	 prior	 quarter	 median	G53(	((K9]>^)	of	all	bank	holding	companies	that	registered	with	SEC.		All	other	variables	used	in	the	regression	analyses	in	Panel	A	are	defined	the	same	way	as	those	in	Table	6.			Panel	B	presents	the	sensitivity	analyses	with	an	additional	control	variable	]>/ℎ+, .		]>/ℎ+, 	is	defined	as	cash	and	cash	equivalents	before	sales	of	investment	securities	scaled	by	total	assets.	 	All	the	other	variables	used	in	the	regression	analyses	in	Panel	B	are	defined	the	same	way	as	those	in	Table	6.			Panel	 C	 presents	 the	 regression	 analyses	 of	 Equation	 (2)	with	 the	 dependent	 variable	 replaced	 by	'()*+, .	 	'()*+, 	represents	discretionary	realized	gains	and	losses	on	AFS	securities,	the	calculation	of	which	is	explained	in	Section	6.3.		All	the	other	variables	used	in	the	regression	analyses	in	Panel	C	are	defined	the	same	way	as	those	in	Table	6.			Panel	D	presents	the	regression	analyses	of	Equation	(2)	with	NIBR	split	into	PosiNI	and	NegNI.	PosiNI(NegNI)	equals	
NIBR	if	NIBR	is	greater(less)	than	zero.	 	IndPosi	equals	1	for	firm-quarters	with	positive	NIBR.	 	All	the	other	variables	used	in	the	regression	analyses	in	Panel	D	are	defined	the	same	way	as	the	those	in	Table	6.		For	 the	 whole	 sample,	N	 =	 3,444	 bank	 quarters	 for	 treatment	 banks	 and	 620	 for	 control	 banks.	 	 For	 the	matched	sample,	N	=	628	bank	quarters	for	treatment	banks	and	620	for	control	banks.		All	continuous	variables	are	winsorized	at	 the	 1st	 and	 99th	 percentiles.	 	T-statistics	 are	 based	 on	 standard	 errors	 clustered	 by	 bank	 and	 quarter.	 	 ***,	 **,	 *	indicate	 variables	 significant	 at	 the	0.01,	 0.05	 and	0.1	 level,	 using	 one-sided	 (two-sided)	 t-tests	 for	 variables	 having	predicted	signs	(no	predicted	signs).		
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Table	11.	Sensitivity	Tests	with	Alternative	Subsamples	
	
Panel	A.	Alternative	Sample	without	One-single-statement	Users	
	
Panel	B.	Alternative	Matched	Subsample	without	One-single-statement	Users	
		 	
	 	 Exp.	 Y-variable=!"#$% 		 	 Sign	 Coefficient	 			T-stat.	&'(()ℎ+,$% 	 β1	 ?	 −0.02539	 −0.98	-./01)ℎ+,$% 	 β2	 ?	 −0.01103	 −0.51	23456×89::6;<=>?			 β3	 −	 		−0.04024*	 −1.49	23456×@>AB56;<=>?		 β4	 +	 0.01662	 0.69	CD&E×&'(()ℎ+,$% 	 β5		 ?	 −0.01532	 −0.75	CD&E×-./01)ℎ+,$% 	 β6	 ?	 0.02769	 1.05	23456×FG82×89::6;<=>?		 β7	 +	 						0.03444**	 1.78	23456×FG82×@>AB56;<=>?		 β8	 −	 		−0.04170*	 −1.41	
Other	Controls	and	Interaction	Terms	 	 	 Yes	
Firm	fixed	effects	 	 	 Yes	
N	 	 	 3,728	
Adj.	R-squared	 	 	 0.267	
	 	 Exp.	 Y-variable=!"#$% 		 	 Sign	 Coefficient	 			T-stat.	&'(()ℎ+,$% 	 β1	 ?	 −0.02685	 −1.02	-./01)ℎ+,$% 	 β2	 ?	 −0.01016	 −0.52	23456×89::6;<=>?			 β3	 −	 		−0.05056*	 −1.63	23456×@>AB56;<=>?		 β4	 +	 						0.03760**	 1.79	CD&E×&'(()ℎ+,$% 	 β5		 ?	 −0.01507	 −0.73	CD&E×-./01)ℎ+,$% 	 β6	 ?	 0.02680	 1.17	23456×FG82×89::6;<=>?		 β7	 +	 						0.04049**	 1.73	23456×FG82×@>AB56;<=>?		 β8	 −	 		−0.04309*	 −1.54	
Other	Controls	and	Interaction	Terms	 	 	 Yes	
Firm	fixed	effects	 	 	 Yes	
N	 	 	 936	
Adj.	R-squared	 	 	 0.289	
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Table	11.	Sensitivity	Tests	with	Alternative	Subsamples	-	Continued	
	
Panel	C.	All	Treatment	Banks	Subsample	
	
Panel	D.	Largest	Treatment	Banks	Subsample	
	 	 Exp.	 Y-variable=!"#$% 		 	 Sign	 Coefficient	 			T-stat.	&'(()ℎ+,$% 	 β1	 −	 						−0.04720***	 −3.73	-./01)ℎ+,$% 	 β2	 +	 0.00567	 0.84	HIJ564×89::6;<=>?	 β3	 +	 						0.02587**	 2.68	HIJ564×@>AB56;<=>?	 β4	 −	 0.00344	 0.24	KL"#$%MN	 β5		 +	 								0.02583***	 5.62	!O/P1Q$% 	 β6	 −	 −0.00021	 −0.40	KR&$% 	 β7	 ?	 0.00011	 0.39	EST% 	 β8	 ?	 −0.00006	 −0.36	U,V% 	 β	9		 ?	 						0.00001**	 2.14	LQW1)O	 β	10	 ?	 −0.00003	 −0.37	,XW&'(()ℎ	 β	11	 ?	 0.00005	 0.75	LQW1)O×,XW&'(()ℎ	 β	12	 ?	 0.00001	 0.10	
Firm	fixed	effects	 	 	 Yes	
N	 	 	 4,068	
Adj.	R-squared	 	 	 0.233	
	 	 Exp.	 Y-variable=!"#$% 		 	 Sign	 Coefficient	 			T-stat.	&'(()ℎ+,$% 	 β1	 −	 						−0.04785***	 −2.90	-./01)ℎ+,$% 	 β2	 +	 0.01341	 0.41	FG82×89::6;<=>?	 β3	 +	 						0.03541**	 2.14	FG82×@>AB56;<=>?	 β4	 −	 				−0.08395**	 −2.16	KL"#$%MN	 β5		 +	 				0.01158*	 1.36	!O/P1Q$% 	 β6	 −	 0.00010	 0.13	KR&$% 	 β7	 ?	 0.00052	 0.64	EST% 	 β8	 ?	 −0.00006	 −0.23	U,V% 	 β	9		 ?	 0.00001	 1.23	CD&E	 β	10	 ?	 −0.00013	 −0.47	,XW&'(()ℎ	 β	11	 ?	 0.00025	 1.52	CD&E×,XW&'(()ℎ	 β	12	 ?	 0.00002	 0.10	
Firm	fixed	effects	 	 	 Yes	
N	 	 	 744	
Adj.	R-squared	 	 	 0.254	
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This	table	presents	the	sensitivity	tests	with	several	alternative	subsamples.		Panels	A	and	B	present	 the	 regression	analyses	of	Equation	 (2)	excluding	 the	one-single-statement	 users.	 	 The	 regression	 analyses	 in	 Panel	 C	 examine	 changes	 in	 the	earnings	management	 of	 treatment	 banks	 that	 switched	 the	 reporting	 position	 in	2011,	2012	and	2013.	 	The	regression	analyses	 in	Panel	D	examine	changes	in	the	earnings	management	of	an	extremely	large	treatment	banks	subsample.		For	 the	 regression	 analyses	 in	 Panel	 A,	 I	 exclude	 8	 control	 banks	 that	 used	 one-single-statement	 reporting	 in	 the	 pre-update	 period,	 and	 9	 treatment	 banks	 that	used	one-single-statement	reporting	in	the	post-update	period.		The	final	sample	for	the	regression	analyses	 in	Table	11	Panel	A	 includes	3,728	bank-quarters	 from	24	control	banks	and	166	treatment	banks.			For	 the	regression	analyses	 in	Panel	B,	 I	used	a	matched	subsample	excluding	 the	one-single-statement	 users,	 in	 which	 I	 have	 24	 control	 banks	 and	 24	 treatment	banks.	 	 To	 generate	 this	 matched	 subsample,	 I	 match	 each	 control	 bank	 to	 a	treatment	bank	with	the	closest	average	quarterly	LD,	MTB,	SIZE	and	AFS	in	the	pre-update	period	using	a	Mahalanobis	matching	method.	 	LD,	MTB,	SIZE	 and	AFS	 are	defined	 in	 Appendix	 2.	 	 The	 final	 sample	 for	 the	 regression	 analyses	 in	 Table	 11	Panel	B	contains	936	bank-quarters.		Panel	 C	 presents	 the	 regression	 results	 of	 Equation	 (6)	 with	 all	 the	 banks	 that	changed	 their	 reporting	 position	 of	 CI	 from	 the	 equity	 statements	 to	 the	performance	 statements	 during	 the	 test	 period	 following	 ASU-2011-05,	 which	includes	 the	banks	 that	 switched	 the	 reporting	position	 in	2011	 (31	banks),	2012	(175	banks)	and	2013	(5	banks).	 	Update=1	 in	 the	quarters	after	 treatment	banks	adopted	 ASU-2011-05.	 	 The	 final	 sample	 for	 the	 regression	 analyses	 in	 Table	 11	Panel	C	contains	4,068	bank-quarters.		Panel	 D	 presents	 the	 regression	 results	 of	 Equation	 (7)	with	 38	 treatment	 banks	that	have	average	total	assets	in	the	test	period	above	10	billion.	 	The	final	sample	for	the	regression	analyses	in	Table	11	Panel	D	contains	744	bank-quarters.		All	 variables	are	defined	 in	Appendix	2.	 	T-statistics	 are	based	on	 standard	errors	clustered	by	bank	and	quarter.	 	 ***,	 **,	 *	 indicate	variables	 significant	 at	 the	0.01,	0.05	and	0.1	level,	using	one-sided	(two-sided)	t-tests	for	variables	having	predicted	signs	(no	predicted	signs).	
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Table	12.		Sensitivity	Tests	with	Alternative	Test	Periods	
	
 
	 Exp.	 (1) Period	99-09	 (2) Period	99-06	 (3) Period	07-09	
 
	 Sign	 Coefficient	 T-stat.	 Coefficient	 T-stat.	 Coefficient	 T-stat.	!"##$ℎ&'()	 β1	 −	 −0.01470***	 −2.47	 −0.02193***	 −2.81	 −0.00910	 −0.84	*+,-.$ℎ&'()	 β2	 +	 0.01053**	 2.37	 0.03043**	 2.29	 0.00939**	 2.61	/012×4566789:;<	 β3	 +	 0.01122	 1.01	 0.02316*	 1.36	 0.00625	 0.81	/012×=;>?@789:;<	 β4	 −	 −0.01914***	 −2.61	 −0.04535**	 −1.91	 −0.01127*	 −1.51	ABCD()EF	 β5	 +	 0.03310***	 6.26	 0.02226***	 6.33	 0.07589***	 6.49	GH,I.J()	 β6	 −	 −0.00088***	 −2.81	 −0.00097***	 −3.89	 −0.00317**	 −2.51	AK!()	 β7	 ?	 0.00051***	 4.43	 0.00039***	 3.56	 0.00089**	 2.22	LMN)	 β8	 ?	 −0.00009**	 −2.61	 −0.00004	 −1.40	 −0.00012*	 −1.81	O'P)	 β9	 ?	 0.00000	 1.20	 0.00000***	 3.41	 0.00000	 0.88	QHRS	 β10	 ?	 −0.00003	 −0.37	 −0.00015	 −1.31	 0.00010	 0.69	'TU!"##$ℎ	 β11	 ?	 0.00011***	 2.98	 0.00018**	 2.31	 0.00002	 0.82	QHRS×'TU!"##$ℎ	 β12	 ?	 −0.00001	 −0.16	 0.00006	 0.79	 0.00001	 0.09	
β1	+	β3	 	 	 −0.00349	 −0.28	 −0.00124	 0.07	 0.00285	 −0.26	
β	2	+	β4	 	 	 −0.00862	 −1.56	 −0.01492	 −0.70	 −0.00188	 −0.25	
Firm	fixed	effects	 	 	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
N	 	 	 15,207	 11,390	 3,817	
Adj.	R-squared	 	 	 0.157	 0.186	 0.246	This	 table	presents	 the	estimation	results	of	Equation	(8)	with	data	 in	the	 following	test	periods:	1999–2009,	1999–2006	and	2007–2009.		The	samples	contain	bank-quarters	with	reporting	position	data	of	CI	in	SEC	EDGAR	system	and	necessary	regression	variables	in	the	bank	regulatory	database.			QHRS=1	for	bank-quarters	with	CI	presented	in	the	performance	statements.		All	other	variables	are	defined	the	same	way	as	those	in	Equation	(2).		Period	1999	to	2009	has	15,207	bank-quarters	and	3,306	of	them	have	QHRS=1	(Table	12	
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Column	1).		Period	1999–2006	has	11,390	bank-quarters	and	2,528	of	them	have	QHRS=1	(Table	12	Column	2).		Period	2007–2009	has	3,817	bank-quarters	and	778	of	them	have	QHRS=1	(Table	12	Column	3).				
T-statistics	are	based	on	standard	errors	clustered	by	bank	and	quarter.	 	***,	**,	*	indicate	variables	significant	at	the	0.01,	0.05	and	0.1	level,	using	one-sided	(two-sided)	t-tests	for	variables	having	predicted	signs	(no	predicted	signs).			
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